Space, a vital element of contemporary social boundaries, has prompted debate into the significance, embodiment, construction of spatiality and the marginality and exclusion of minorities. Such 'disabled' relations' at the intersection of self and other, self and self, and self and objects function through spatial organization and negotiations of power in everyday experiences. Martin Heidegger's interpretation of space (Being and Time, 1927) allows for new considerations of existence in relation to categorization, labelling and exile of those outside mass society. Human existence is not one of subjectivity but rather the nature of the world through 'Space' as a condition of individual experience and inclusive of all aspects of Dasein's Being-in-the-world-with-others. This paper, using Heidegger's analysis, highlights social interaction and construction of disability as a product of interpretive processes, creating and maintaining division between 'normal and other' and thus ignoring the possibility of conceiving disability as a legitimate, valued embodied difference.

These persons frequently live in deplorable conditions, owing to the presence of physical and social barriers, which prevent their integration and full participation in the community. As a result, millions of disabled people throughout the world are segregated and deprived of virtually all their rights and lead a wretched marginal life

(Despouy, 1992, p.1).

The production and knowledge of space is a vital element of contemporary Western society. A relational exercise of power largely determines position and quality of life. The development and interest into the geography and theoretical analysis of space has created scholarship into the significance of social space, the embodiment of space and the social construction of spatiality. Marginality and exclusion function through the exercise of power co-ordinated by means of the cultural, political, economic and spatial organization of society. Such disabled 'relations' are produced at the intersection of self and other, self and self and self and objects through the negotiation of power structures in everyday experiences. Traditionally space has been considered from three general theoretical positions; absolutist, relationist and Kantian perspectives which according to Heidegger (1962) are grounded in the metaphysical subject / object dichotomy. Heidegger's (1962) notion of human existence is not one of subjectivity but intimately bound to the nature of world itself. 1 Indeed in suggesting the nature and character of 'space' was a condition of individual experience, Heidegger (1962) claims its essentiality to Dasein's 2 Being and involvement in the world. The theoretical concept attempts to re-describe spatial experience without assuming / taking for granted, objective space by unfolding the lived space within the finite perspective of individual Being.

Humankind is not 'in space' as an object but as a mode of existence and Dasein's existential (of / or pertaining to one's Being) characteristic is inclusive of every aspect of its Being-in-the-world 3 with others 4 and not just the 'self' (Care) 5. Dasein's understanding of 'others' reality through the concept of space offers the chance for the elimination of social boundaries. Heidegger's (1962) interpretation allows for new considerations of existence in relation to categorization, labelling and the exile of those outside the ideal or mass society.

This paper, by explaining the nature of space, will highlight Dasein's unique Being-with through familiarity (disclosedness) 6 as distinct from objective placement. For where the space of things remains linked to position and 'containment,' distance and closeness, low and high, inside and outside are lived realities of 'involvement.' Dasein's spatiality or Situation 7 is a primordial concept offering signification within-the-world as distinguished from our collective reliance on social conformity (The They) 8 and averageness of interpretation (inauthenticity) 9 which has Dasein losing itself through the ongoing experience or phenomenon of social normativity (das Man). 10 By considering the structures of space: de-severance, directionality and regionality, the relationship of the individual (Care) and the existential nature of space will be established to assist with the development of discussions involving contemporary issues of space as it relates to Dasein with an Impairment 11 in broad terms. This analysis will explore specific social and economic circumstances by focusing the analysis on Critical Disability Studies and the evolving Studies in Ableism. 12 The inclusion of autobiographical commentaries and reflections by Nancy Mairs (1996) 13 will present a practical demonstration and interpretation of significant points of Heidegger's (1962) writing and offer the embodied, first-person 'reality' of the disabled individual through a pragmatic engagement with-in the world in order to offset the prevailing hegemonic view that privileges abled-ness (Overboe, 2009) and the logic or space of binary oppositions. For while Heidegger (1962) does not interpret space and its interaction with the negative modes of solicitude 14 in relation to disability per se, 15 his thoughts undoubtedly describe contemporary reality. Exclusion, institutionalization, social demands, segregation and isolation through disabled 'zones,' 'permits' and official requirements have become increasingly intrusive and discriminatory to Dasein with an Impairment particularly in dealings with das Man.

Material exploitation and physical marginality of disabled people have been historically achieved and reproduced through discriminatory mainstream cultures and political structures (Gleeson, 1999). In Western contemporary society, disabled people are still allowed to suffer the inhumanity characterized through universal service delivery, dispassionate institutional interaction and impersonal 'classifications' for inclusion in the community (Michalko, 2009). Such marginalization situates the disabled person as the 'object' of inquiry and fails to provide non-disabled individuals the connection to their experience (Gleeson, 1999). Yet Heidegger's (1962) Being-with necessitates such in order to promote one's own-most possibilities. Deterministic beliefs and the medicalization of disability have provided for the examination of impairment and functional limitations as the identification of Dasein with an Impairment over the more complex and nuance experience of its lived-experience (Linton, 1998) As Mairs (1996) comments:

Blindness, deafness, intellectual impairment all qualify as 'disabilities' (or 'differing abilities' to people with merely mouths) but the circumstances they impose are nothing like mine…I'm not denying the seriousness of my situation but I think it's very important to distinguish 'disability' which is a social construction rather than a medical diagnosis from some of the circumstances associated with it often by people with little or no knowledge of the physical and mental limitations and their consequences (p.13).

Heidegger's (1962) interpretation of space clearly underscores disability as merely a product of interpretive social processes. Its discriminatory nature, the consequence of habitual cultural and political power and thinking (Michalko, 2009), is maintained by preserving divisions between the normal and 'others.' Michalko (2009) argues that disability is perceived as trouble; a 'thing' inconvenient and problematic to society, which Western society simply handed to medicine for diagnose through Foucault's (1973) 'clinical gaze. By classification as a 'thing,' undifferentiated das Man has ignored the possibility of conceiving disability as an existentially legitimate and valued embodied difference (Michalko, 2009) for 'The They' (in the desire for social conformity) know only the general situation (Lage) 16 (abled-bodiness) in familiar space and 'making room' for others has remained subjective. Heidegger (1962) though, offers a new method of understanding Dasein's spatiality, as grounded and disclosed in Being-in-the world.

Heidegger and Spatiality

Unfortunately, Heidegger's (1962) theory and discussion on space, while an essential component of Being-in-the-world, has been largely disregarded as a potentially constructive theme for deliberation. This is partly the consequence of Heidegger's early presentation or treatment designating space as of secondary importance and dependent upon time. 17 A great deal of academic commentary has effectively accepted the apparently 'evident' lesser significance of space and dismissed the subject as worthy of consideration or application. However the analysis of this paper will re-cast and reconstruct the original undertaking in line with arguments presented by Arisaka (1996; 1995), Baiasu (2007), Malpas (2008) and Vallega (2003) in suggesting spatiality is a co-original constituent with temporality and therefore fundamental to Dasein's existence. As Arisaka (1996) and Baiasu (2007) maintain, space and time are equipmordial (or equally fundamental, primordial) rather than foundational (where space is dependent upon time). This non-hierarchical, non-conditional relationship remains mutually interdependent for interactions with others (Mitda-sein) and things for Dasein and the world are equal existential (pertaining to one's Being) constituents of its reality.

In his development of Dasein, Heidegger (1990) claims that it is 'essentially "fettered in a body" (p.181) and therefore in a distinctly new relationship with the world (Casey, 1997) to that explained by Cartesian theory. While Descartes argues for the non-spatial ego, Heidegger (1962) contends spatiality is a defining characteristic of Dasein and as the concrete body, its bodily nature, presupposes the more primordial ground, not as a function of the mind but rather the body, for it occupies space (Situation) in an essentially different manner to 'things.' "Dasein…is spatial" (Heidegger, 1962, p.143) and relational through active involvement in the complexity and structure of things, places regions and other individuals (Malpas 2008). Mairs (1996) clearly highlights the complexity, involvedness and usefulness of Heidegger's interpretation of space, of Being, when describing her perceived marginalized 'place' and implied reality, or worth, within the wider sociality:

Regardless of the way marginality is conceived, it is never taken to mean that those on the margin occupy a physical space literally outside the field of vision of those in the centre, so that the latter trip unawares and fall into the laps of those who have been banished from consciousness unless these scoot safely out of the way. 'Marginality' thus means something altogether different to me from what it means to social theorists. It is no metaphor for the power relations between one group of human beings and another but literal description of the where I stand (figuratively speaking): over here, on the edge, out of bounds, beneath your notice. I embody the metaphor. Only whether or not I like doing so is immaterial (p.59).

The inhabited space of Dasein, its spatiality of Situation, has none of the common understanding or implications of space / place as it relates solely to the illumination of Being as an authentic existential dimension and its distinction from the inauthentic spatiality of 'The They' (Malpas, 2008). Mairs (1996) offers a clear explanation by suggesting that the "body occupies space and the quality of the space it occupies correlates to the condition of the soul" (p.57). In its undifferentiated state however, das Man is essentially closed-off from the condition of possibilities of cultural space for 'The They' lose itself in the generality of "opportunities, which are closest to it" (Heidegger, 1962, p.346). Such generalities, essentially discriminatory and marginalizing for all social minorities are confirmed by Mairs (1996) by suggesting:

The general public, [abledbodied sociality] have an easier time (or simply unconsciously prefer) dealing with people with disabilities by lumping us all together and assuming that we all have the same problem and, what is worse, that all we deal with or have in our life is our disability (p. 128).

Concepts defined

Heidegger's (1962) concept and explanation of space (proximity) distinguish three types of space: a) world-space, b) regions and c) spatiality of Dasein through de-severance (Ent-fernung) and directionality (Ausrichtung). World-space signifies space conceived or representative of a container or arena, of containment, and represents or captures the traditional and absolutist concept of space. 18 Chairs, doors, tables and buildings exist 'in' space, things, events happen 'in' space 19 but world-space is independent of such things and functions as a relational framework to the entities extended 'in' space (Arisaka, 1996; Malpas, 2008; Wollan, 2003). Heidegger (1962) calls such entities as present-at-hand because "they are of such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of 'being' is not of the character of Dasein" (p.79) but representative of an undifferentiated space within the physical universe and an abstraction from the primarily lived reality (Malpas, 2008; Wollan, 2003) and involvement of everyday activity.

Indeed the dismissal and invisibility of disabled individuals within the sociality is both persistent and ingrained. Mairs (1996) highlights the habitual, discriminatory nature of the space afforded her, to graphically underscore the pertinence and significance of Heidegger's theory to both Critical Disability Studies and Studies in Ableism by demonstrating her diminished, abstracted, state as merely present-at-hand:

Disability is at once a metaphorical and material state, evocative of other conditions in… space… Imprisonment comes to mind… I went to a luncheon honouring the Dalai Lama… [I] found [myself] in the hallway when the meeting room disgorged the workshop participants-all fourteen hundred of them… into a narrow area further constricted by tables laden with bells beads and brochures… no matter how persuaded they were of the beauty and sacredness of all life, not one of them seemed to think that any life was going on below the level of her or his gaze… 'Down here!' I kept whimpering at the hips and buttocks and bellies pressing my wheelchair on all sides. 'Down here! There is a person down here! My only recourse was to roll to one side and hug the wall (p.59).

Heidegger (1962) maintains everything an individual deals with or engages, is either near or far relative to that individual and therefore the understanding of such 'nearness' and /or 'farness' becomes how an individual familiarizes or learns to represent oneself as space. This 'proximity' is the basis of how humankind comes to represents itself, not through containment or objective measurement but as a state of Being. Yet again Mairs (1996), eloquent in asserting her personal perspective of the world, demonstrates the capacity of Heidegger's theory to question the alienation of the presupposed 'subjective' province of the abled-bodied experience:

I am literally diminished by my disability, reduced to a height of about 4' 8," consigned to gazing at navels (generally shrouded) other than my own. But diminution is not the whole of it. "Waist-high" also resonates "knee-deep." This is not piteously deprived state I'm in down here but a rich, complicated, and utterly absorbing process of immersion in whatever the world has to offer (p.18).

This notion of representation, of spatial proximity, is disclosed by Heidegger (1962) through the other two concepts; regions and spatiality. a) Regions or the space an individual engages in daily life, such as at home or in one's office, are considered to be equipment, (ready-to-hand) and organize and regulate one's activities and behaviour. 20 Regions differ from world-space (containers) for they provide a referential method to contextualize one's activities by determining a 'here' with respect to the one's movements and dealings with things (Arisaka 1995). In other words, regions are essentially organized by the activities that originate from a center of action. As Arisaka (1995) clarifies "the perspective presupposed in world-space is a standpoint of an infinite observer whereas the perspective in a region is a finite perspective of an acting agent "(p.4).

The second measure or concept of proximity within Heidegger's discussion, Dasein's spatiality 21, identifies the difference between the expression that 'one exists 'in' space' and the notion that 'one exists spatially' for as Heidegger asserts Dasein as spatial, "through care" a mode of one's existence (Heidegger, 1962, p.419); and defined through the existentials; de-severance (Ent-fernung) 22 and directionality (Ausrichtung). Dasein is 'in' the world through its involvement or dealings with entities within-the-world in a concerned and familiar manner. Spatiality belongs to Dasein through this Being-in (In-Sein), and presents the idea of situatedness. 23 Characteristically then, for Dasein to 'be' is for Dasein to dwell. Its situation or position in the world or environment cannot be separated from the reality of what it is, of what is close, familiar and already engaged (Malpas, 2008). De-severance describes how Dasein exists in a "process of self-determination by making things available" (Arisaka, 1996, p.37). Not simply a contemplative being, it exists through concrete action in-the-world; in making things available 'it takes-in space' by 'making the farness vanish' and 'bringing things close' (Heidegger, 1962, p.138). De-severance is not objective distance nor measured or calculated in objective terms but remains the manner or behaviour and urgency or necessity with which one encounters things (de Beistegui, 2005). Objective distance remains present-at-hand and does not relate to the remoteness or closeness of "what is ready-to-hand-within-the-world" (Heidegger, 1962, p.106). For example, in order to go somewhere, some place yonder, one might suggest it was 'a fairly long walk,' 'very close' or possibly suggest an exact time period for achievement or completion. However the intent or explanation is not a quantitative or exact measure but rather a qualitative dimension or interlude infused with the life and attitude of existence (de Beistegui, 2005). 24

Heidegger (1962) in identifying the second characteristic of spatiality, directionality, asserts that existence is always orientated towards things in a particular way, already engaged in this transitive activity of 'nearing' or 'bringing close' (Näherung) even if, or when, apparently unattainable or impossibly beyond one's reach (de Beistegui, 2005). As Arisaka (1996) and de Beistegui (2005) explain, in reaching for entities ready-to-hand and going to places, "shifting spatial perspectives are created" (Arisaka, 1996, p.37) through the inherently directional process. Every de-servering is focused towards something or a certain direction as determined by Dasein's 'concern' or perspective and movement into specific regions. Such directions, which "Dasein takes with it, are inscribed within its very body, as this lived body" (de Beistegui, 2005, p.67). De-serverance, directionality and regionality then together represent the equipmordial components of spatiality (Arisaka, 1996) in a 'unified' Being-in-the-world. 25 de Beistegui (2005) qualifies the position by asserting that "in letting things be encountered within the world, [society] gives them space…Dasein frees or clears a space for things to emerge, and frees the space or the place that is proper to such things"(p.68). Mairs (1996) claims her space within the world and clearly demonstrates the significance and capacity of 'shifting spatial perspectives' to re-define society by its ability to re-interpret viewpoints and re-characterize positions:

I am disabled then, only from 'your' point of view (and 'you' from 'mine'). Whoever gets to define ability puts everyone else in place, which (human nature tending to define one's own as the proper place) then becomes other, outside: a cheerless and chilly spot. No wonder I prefer the self-defined 'cripple.' When I have occasion to refer to a class with a broader spectrum of impairments, I use the more conventional 'people with disabilities,' or 'the disabled' for short; and people who lack them I call 'the nondisabled,' since in relation to me, they are the deficient ones. Already in this way, I begin to reconstruct the world (p.14).

The Space afforded Dasein with an Impairment

The lived body or situation… provides people with their perspective of the world… suggesting that although the body does not cease to be an object with physicality, it is a style of being, an intonation, a specific way of being present in the world (Moi, 2005, p.68).

To reiterate: Dasein is not a placeless entity but rather, situated in social space and conceptualized through its engagement in the world. The resultant 'making room' 26 or the giving of space is characteristic of the familiarity of Dasein and fundamentally different to the 'place' of equipment and positioning of objects or things in world-space. The general situation (Lage) signifies Dasein's existence in the social world and relation to 'others' (Baiasu, 2007). The everyday social world finds Dasein constantly with-others. Being-with is possible, for human 'being-ness' is essentially relational and therefore suggesting that one can walk alongside but also be 'outside' or disconnected to objects and individuals, "but [still] remain indicative of the other" (Heidegger, 1962, p.154). The social spatiality of Dasein is thus the spatiality of Being-with. Distinguished from the de-severance with relation to equipment, the making room for 'others,' has Dasein maintaining a 'distance' as Heidegger (1962) argues:

In one's concern with what one has taken hold of, whether with for, or against the others there is constant care as to the way one differs… whether… merely one to be evened out, whether one's own Dasein has lagged behind the others…or whether one's Dasein already has some priority… and sets out to keep them suppresses. The care about this distance… is disturbing to Being-with-one-another though this disturbance is… hidden from it. If we may express this existentially such Being-with-one-another has the character of distantiality (p.162, emphasis added).

This social character of distantiality 27 signifies distance as a feature of the general situation (Lage) of undifferentiated das Man in its objectification of Dasein with an Impairment for such 'things' or "entities were not the type of being[s] which would make it capable of de-servering… they merely have measurable distance [from das Man] which comes across" (Heidegger, 1962, p.139). Such 'distance,' remains clearly evident in the endemic discriminatory practices of ableist relations for 'ableism is the domination of space by an exclusionary ethos' 28 which allows Dasein with an Impairment to be little more than objects, present-at-hand.

Heidegger (1962) acknowledges that Dasein can be understood as present-at-hand (mere entities in worldspace) with "categorical characteristics of entities whose nature is not that of Dasein" (p.139). Such is the 'reality' of Dasein with an Impairment in contemporary society for as Malpas (2008) argues such a circumstance demonstrates a complete disregard for the existential state of Being-with. The nature and space afforded disability's regionality has been constituted and mediated with cultural processes (Michalko, 2009) to be "an alien terrain" (Mairs, 1996, p.72) and invalidated as a worthwhile existential status through historical social definition (Hughes, 2007). Studies in Ableism have shown that the process of social distancing has been accomplished through physical fear of frailty, bodily difference and social vulnerability that over time has provided the contemporary hierarchy of social legitimacy (Campbell, 2005; Hughes, 2007). Mairs (1996) experiences such abled-bodied distancing and reminds us of both the persistent categorizing and consequence of expectations through social authority, power and indeed fear:

To know that one arouses dismay and fear and pity simply sickens the spirit \of anyone whether sound of limb and mind or not. One is tempted to withdraw altogether, at least from the company of 'normals,' so as to avoid the indignity; but disappearance from the scene, however welcome to both parties, won't lead to change. It is not, after all, entirely the fault of people without disabilities that they don't know how to treat those of us with. Until rather recently, the lack of access and assistive technology, combined with social opprobrium, kept many of us out of public view. What intercourse occurred was marked by distance, restraint, even condescension, it was certainly not a communion of equals… in insisting that others view our lives as ample and precious, we are not demanding that they be made perfect. There are rewards for making the world physically and emotionally accessible to all people, including benefits that accrue to society as a whole. The more perspectives that can be brought to bear on human experience, even from the slant of a wheelchair… the richer the experience becomes. If it is both possible and pleasant for me and my kind to enter, the world will become a livelier place. You'll see (pp.103-106).

Hughes (2007) argues that ableism's normative fantasy of an invulnerable body has been widely used to create and sustain social distance between the abled-bodied and Dasein with an Impairment for disability represented all the difficulties of human existence. Moreover as "non-disabled people pity us, they presume that we must also pity ourselves" (Mairs, 1996, p.32). Yet the problem is actually a function of the privileged normative body of undifferentiated das Man in its rejection of its own vulnerability for Dasein with Impairment "exposes the illusion of autonomy, self-government and self-determination that underpins the fantasy of absolute abled-bodiness" (Thomson, 1997, p.45). Campbell (2005) asserts, almost without fail in modern discourse, disability "is assumed to be ontologically intolerable…inherently negative [and] always present in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization and humanness" (p.100) and truly ironic that das Man's ontological insecurity is the 'original sin' responsible for the marginalization of Dasein with an Impairment (Hughes, 2007). For disability is not the result of infractions against social norms but the delusion of the normative body to reject and dismiss its own vulnerability and date with death.

As Dasein exists in common with 'others,' Being-with presupposes the unsocial sociability 29 of humankind in which some individuals within society intentionally resist assimilation to the normative rule, rejecting the herd mentality (Malpas, 2008), providing for individuality, the inevitable conflict, mistrust and antagonism among members of the communal world. Heidegger (1962) 30 unveils this as the essential character of Being-with of Dasein for:

Everyday Being-with-one-another maintains itself between two forms of positive solicitude… that which jumps in and dominates and that which leaps forth and liberates…solicitude is guided by considerateness and forbearance…range[ing] through their respective deficient and indifferent modes up to the point of inconsiderateness or the perfunctoriness for which indifference leads the way (p.159, emphasis added).

Malpas (2008) argues that Being-with represents an understanding of 'residing' or 'dwelling,' involving familiarity and the sense of taking Care. Dwelling, being close, a 'nearing' is not objective difference but the bringing to attention, representations that would overcome the distance of inattention, 'invisibility' and negative attitudes which "hold the lives of some among us as cheap, even expendable" (Mairs, 1996, p.99). Solicitude then, becomes a state of Dasein's 'Being,' in "accordance with different possibilities [and] bound…towards a world of…concern and authenticity" (Heidegger, 1962, p.159). Being-with-one-another is "based proximally and often exclusively upon what is a matter of common concern in…Being…the result of uniformity (Entspringt) and commonality keeps das Man within limits though 'a mode of 'distance' (Abstend) and reserve" (Heidegger, 1962, p.159) which thrives on mistrust (Mißtrauen). Disability is the function of 'anxiety' within the social relationship between Dasein with an Impairment and social normativity. Mairs (1996) draws attention to such inauthentic, destructive tension or reserve, surrounding the desire for limiting the possibility of different possibilities of Being:

I do feel certain, in view of the human propensity for exploiting whatever techniques we can devise with virtually no regard for consequences, that more and more people will choose, either for their own reasons or in response to the social pressure not to produce 'unnecessary' burdens, to terminate pregnancies so as to avoid birth defects (and to select for sex as well). This development won't eradicate people with disabilities, of course: birth trauma, accidental injury, and disease will continue to create them from those who have started out as even the healthiest foetuses. What it will do is to make their social position even more marginal by emphasizing that no one with the power to choose would ever have permitted them to exist. Their own choice to survive will seem suspect. We're doing everything we can to exterminate your kind, the social message will read, and we'd get rid of you to if only we knew how. No one will ever say this. No one will have to (p.112)

Critical Disability Studies highlights the shared experience of Dasein with an Impairment in struggling for recognition and equal rights (Lee, 2006), as Linton (1998) maintains they were not just bound through biomedical lists of collective symptoms but through the social and political circumstances. Heidegger (1962) offers an explanation for this 'othering' through social attitude, barriers and the limitation of opportunities in suggesting the nature of Being-with-one-another forged through:

Those hired for the same affair often thrive only on mistrust however when devoted to the same affair, in common, their doing is determined by the manner in which Dasein, each in its own way has been taken hold of authentically… [making it] possible for the right kind of objectivity (die rechte Sachlichkeit) which frees the Other in his freedom for himself (p.159).

Humankind has produced the 'othering' of Dasein with an Impairment through the hiring of a welfare state devoted to profits rather than authentic interaction with others. In the general situation (Lage) or communal world, there is distance, for das Man is only concerned with the given, the present. Since this is an element of being-with, the undifferentiated state is not considerate, cohesive or united with Dasein with an Impairment but dispersed and aloof through distantiality constituting the definition of contemporary civil society (Gesellschaft) (Lewis, 2005; Fealy, 2008; Malpas, 2008; Michalko, 2009), which remains antagonistic through presupposition of 'distance' between individuals (Malpas, 2008). 31 Dasein, as a 'they-self,' gets lived by the commonsense ambiguity of that publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything but which has always made its decision for the "irresoluteness of 'The They' remains dominant" (Heidegger, 1962, p.345).

The Social Distancing (Distantiality) of Disability

Dasein's basic…Being is characterised by existence, by understanding what it means to be in a particular way…a self-interpreting 'Being' but there is no single way of taking hold of this existence that is mandatory or privileged (Salem-Wiseman, 2003, p.535, emphasis added).

Heidegger's (1962) spatiality as an existential, a condition of possibility, of basic disclosing of humankind's authenticity with relation to the Self, and the world (Baiasu, 2007) "holds none of the solipsistic 'traditions' or underpinning" of modern social relationships. For just as the individual does not first find itself apart from the world, the interaction of "self and the world, being given together, does not first find itself apart from the world but is instead always already there among others" (Malpas, 2008, p.89). However Dasein's 'thrownness' (circumstances basically beyond individual control) limits its particular path and possibility for in its everydayness, it has drifted along, choosing collectively, the least line of resistance in the stereotypical, ready-to-hand, socially approved alternatives (Baiasu, 2007; Salem-Wiseman, 2003). This universality or 'world conscience' is representative of the voice of das Man (removed from the Situation) and revealed only through the general situation (Lage) as justification and stipulation of possibilities through the domination of the undifferentiated civil society (Salem-Wiseman, 2003). Salem-Wiseman (2003) suggests Heidegger (1962) is not dismissive of the possibility of universal justice or rights per se, but underlined the issues with the particularization of moral and political principles. For as Mairs (1996) suggests, the nature of current ableist principles has affected her particular path, leaving her possibilities and existence restricted by the politics of marginalized interaction:

To insert my embodied self into a world with which over time, I have less and less in common. Part of my effort entails reshaping both that self and that world in order to reconcile the two. We bear certain responsibilities towards each other; the world and I and I must neither remove myself from it nor permit it to exclude me (p. 60).

While the constructed maintenance of perceived difference has provided historical forms of self-protection of the undifferentiated crowd (Kitchin, 2007), Critical Disability Studies calls for urgent political endeavour particularly as contemporary neo-liberal and globalization policies continue to increase marginalization of Dasein with an Impairment (Devlin and Pothier, 2006). Heidegger (1962) calls for cohesion; solidarity with 'others' through the authentic spatiality of Situation (Verbundenheit) which is not to be considered as static receptacle of entities ( present-at-hand) but a network of individual places (dwelling) bound with the historical past and future through resoluteness 32 (the authentic mode of disclosedness). In resoluteness, the issue for Dasein is its own most potentiality-for-Being through the discovery of factical possibilities (Ree, 1998; Tuttle, 2005). Unity of the social world will see das Man going beyond the spatiality of the undifferentiated general situation (Lage) to function authentically as Dasein, in the spatiality of Situation. Heidegger (1962) in dismissing the 'unconditioned' reality of human nature and offering Dasein as a socially embedded, "historically situated self-interpreter" (Salem-Wiseman, 2003, p.540) affords an explanation for eliminating the justification of 'norms,' as presented by the undifferentiated (general situation (Lage) as authoritative for all Dasein. Far from claiming social existence as the inherently inauthentic phenomena, Heidegger (1962) develops a positive interpretation of Dasein's relationships within a particular community 33 (Salem-Wiseman, 2003).

Yet the social construction of 'othering' has continued to be created and maintained through notions of moral superiority, the fear and suspicion of difference, and through specific policies as ingrained protection of the subjective undifferentiated. This learned response is the reaction and result of cultural fabrication and pressure rather than recognition of a primordial element (Shurmer-Smith and Hannam, 1994). Such implicit discrimination has kept Dasein with an Impairment 'in its place,' 'knowing its place,' belonging to a designated place (Kitchin, 2007) as merely present-at-hand and "ensuring [its] social position [as]… marginal" (Mairs, 1996, p.112) depending upon the degree and nature of 'othering' (Creswell, 1996). Heidegger (1962) suggests the "cultivation of such 'superior difference alienates Dasein from its ownmost potentiality-for-being" (p.298, original emphasis). Yet these cultural 'norms' have become legacies through perpetuity with das Man accepting the presumed 'normalcy' of accompanying exclusionary practices as the inevitable and 'commonsense' interaction.

Studies in Ableism is developing as a useful lens with which to unmask such an insidious, discriminatory ideology; the unconscious acceptance, the taken-for-granted practices and policies of social ordering legitimated through 'natural' classification in civil society (Creswell, 1996) and social determination of disability as an 'inferior' identity. For rather than "embracing disability at the level of 'being-ness (i.e. as an intrinsic part of the person's self), the processes of ableism…induce an internalization or self-loathing which devalues disablement" (Campbell, 2009, p.20).' This prejudiced 'creed' and common belief is further explained by Mairs (1996):

For illness and deformity, instead of being considered as human variants…have been portrayed as deviations from the human condition and brought on by personal failing or divine judgment (p.47).

Such sentiment, "of broken bodies as…spoiled and…the potential menace to the bodies around it" (Mairs, 1996, p.48) has deflected attention from the socio-economic political systems, which caused and constructed such oppressive reality. These negative ontologies of signification, of internal distancing and accompanying subjectification by the undifferentiated, have produced regulation and 'norms' (Campbell 2009). Heidegger (1962) suggests, the "dominance of the manner in which things have been publicly interpreted as 'The'They' has already decided what state-of-mind is to determine our attitudes" (p.298) for the normative construction, constitutive of the 'flawed other' provided safety from the fear of disability, delusion in thinking existence was secure, stable and autonomous (Hughes, 2007) and privileged in legal standing.

Campbell (2009) argues that law has been "traditionally ambivalent" (p.30) towards Dasein with an Impairment, restricting itself to arbitration of rules and policies of Care and protection. Yet while the rule of law would argue protection or a committed defence (Fürsorge) 34 of an individual against the arbitrary use of power by governments and institutions, interaction for Dasein with an Impairment has necessitated representation and action in accordance with the 'norms' of abled-ness (Campbell, 2009) and resultant levels of indifference (Besorge) 35 for any provision or 'security' for these people cost money…and why should society pay for someone's [individual] misfortune" (Mairs, 1996, p.122). Disability remains a 'thing' gone wrong, clearly evident and maintained through biomedicalization (Michalko, 2009). Indeed, Campbell (2009) stresses, the entry point of disability into law was through "doors of deficiency" (p.36) and in contesting the neutrality of legal space 36 pointed to the centrality of law in society's spatial hierarchy; for biomedical determination was policed and monitored (by law) as the authority to define identity and scrutinize disability prior to any process involving rights or protective remedies.

Massey (1997) proposes "spatiality is always and everywhere and expression and medium of power" (p.104) and nowhere is that power more obvious that in relation to economics where the productivity of Dasein with an Impairment is a function of its spatial relations. Civil society has remained committed to categorizing Dasein with an Impairment, and its position, or 'space' within the workforce has maintained and accommodated widespread distancing or discriminatory activity. 37 Critical Disability Studies however, offers an opportunity to explore the limits of contemporary economic tolerance or directionality to disability (Kymlicka, 1989). Kitchin (2007) in reference to workspace argues Dasein with an Impairment was excluded; deemed unproductive and hindered the process of capital accumulation. The spatialized political economy, as recognized in the centrality of power, was multifaceted in regionalities of exclusion and strategies of domination and resistance (Kymlicka, 1989). For while liberal ideology technically maintained accommodation policies (de-severance) in line with human rights legislation (Day and Brodsky, 1996) Thornton (2000) argues "neo-liberalism and its shift from equal opportunity to equal responsibility provides evidence that disabled people could only be assimilated (accommodated) if they replicate their benchmark confreres and do not make too many demands on the economic system" (p.19). "For 'The They' at the same time puts itself in the right and makes itself respectable by tactically regulating the way in which one has to comport oneself " (Heidegger, 1962, p.298).

Some disability studies scholars argue accommodation policy and neo-liberal conceptualization of a 'minority identity' is flawed by the implicit social 'norms' inherent in the determinations made by the powerful social groups responsible. As Campbell (2005) surmises it provides for governance and "politics of resentment" (p.116) by das Man for accommodation requires more than the grudging concession. Humankind, if it is to achieve authenticity needs to commit to and encourage the identity of the 'other' through the celebration of 'difference' as a community (Lee, 2006). The alternative is unacceptable. To disregard, to extinguish the reality and contribution of the other, is to project arrogance and superiority that is not authentic for to know the other is to know the self. The destructive nature of othering, the essence of individuality, the ranking and categorizing as present-at-hand has led humankind down a very dangerous path, historically and I suggest, affords it the space to repeat such atrocities for the undifferentiated remains easily distracted and willingly led towards its own oblivion.

The following quote from Mairs (1996) represents a powerful analogy highlighting the discriminatory strength of such oppressive limitation. I find the use of 'hygienic attitudes' particularly insightful in the correlation of disabled people and the German genocide of its Jewish citizenry. It affords a concise yet apt description of both the destructive force and reckless legitimization of righteous, intolerance and culturally defined hierarchies (The They) and thoughtless maintenance of social normative standards (das Man) based on habitual ableist dualities, as well as raising questions about the notion of personal authenticity:

I regularly encounter the sort of hygienic attitudes towards people with disabilities that might have permitted otherwise compassionate human beings to acquiesce in, or at least overlook [the Nazi] desecration of human life. These attitudes may be held, often unawares by people so well meaning and scrupulous that they would be aghast to have their opinion associated even tenuously with the atrocities of an indubitably mad dictator … because the political conditions are not equivalent, we can easily dismiss the underlying danger…[for] human personality tends to retain common elements across time, geography and political regime, being fond of familiar surroundings and routines…suspicious of outsiders, morally righteous, intolerant of ambiguity… unpleasantness…in whatever way its culturally defined …[in] existing social standards ( p. 98).

Hibbs and Pothier (2006) also found there was little recognition of the overall structural and systemic economic barriers for Dasein with an Impairment as the responsibility for the amelioration of 'difference' remained with it as a function of the contemporary governance and normalization processes, required through accommodation policies based on identity. Social power functioned through two dimensions; as a 'thing,' an inherent characteristic implying agency and negotiation and as Foucault (1977) discusses, a fluid network of relations that saw "individuals, self-perception and behaviour based in roles and identity within the system" (p.145). In this 'relationship' the identification of Dasein with an Impairment through standard social biomedical classification provided for a sense of legitimization, entitlement and overall perpetuation of their space. Dasein with an Impairment is a true representation of Foucault's 'docile bodies' (Foucault 1977) as such 'disciplinary power' presupposed agency of Dasein with an Impairment through the invisible, seemingly voluntary adoption of its 'assigned' role (Hibbs and Pothier, 2006) as a "vehicle of subordination" (Campbell, 2005, p.115). As Mairs (1996) elaborates:

People with disabilities…are scrutinized relentlessly…and are expected to fail… Are required in all sorts of subtle ways, even subconscious ways by themselves and others, to show [competence in work] to earn a place among 'normals…only when a new model which defines people with disabilities very precisely in terms not of what they cannot…do but what they can, will the world stop imposing this unwholesome sort of dependency (pp.92-.93).

The biomedicalization of disability has Dasein with an Impairment responsible for instituting their own equity and is also illustrative of disciplinary nature of power (Hibbs and Pothier, 2006). Foucault (1977) suggests that the "establishment of the 'normal' was a principle of coercion…[an] instrument of power, not only indicat[ing] one's membership in a homogenous group [but] play[ing] a part in the classification, hierarchization and distribution of rank"(p.184). There would be little discussion among the ranks of the undifferentiated as to the present nature of space afforded Dasein with an Impairment in contemporary society. Indeed the simplicity of Mairs (1996) plea is a stark reminder of the present-at-hand, callous reality, or relegated positioning 'afforded' disabled individuals by 'The They' in contemporary society:

I imagine a world where people, allowed the space to accept-admit, endure, embrace-their diverse and often difficult realities, will be able to take reasonable measures to ensure basic health without getting burned by a doctor eager to inject them with cobra venom; a dentist willing to tear out all their dental work or a butcher-turned biochemist who wants to drip fluids from unlabeled bottles into veins (p.169).

The Zones of Dis-suitability

Heidegger's (1962) notion of Being-in then, distinguishes the spatiality of Dasein's social existence as 'involvement' (through dwelling and active involvement in the world) from that of 'containment' (the extendable, measurable, objectivity of space) (Malpas, 2008). Malpas (2008) further maintains that this analytical distinction within Heidegger's (1962) discussion of spatiality (through involvement) underlines the notion of dwelling within the world and provides an analysis of dependence or dependent relations within the orientation of Dasein. Therefore this final discussion will adopt Malpas' (2008) interpretation to extrapolate and explore 'dependant relations' with respect to the orientation of Dasein with an Impairment to das Man through the dependence of a) existential spatiality on the functions of the self (Care) b) equipment spatiality on existential spatiality and c) objective spatiality on spatiality of the world. While acknowledging the centrality of temporality in Heidegger's (1962) discussion on these dependencies, I concur with Malpas (2008) in asserting the co-existential relationship of spatiality and its determining influence on such orientation.

The question of orientation through this interpretation has given prominence to the issue of embodiment and the matter of bodily orientation. However, as also previously established in this paper, Heidegger (1962) recognizes the importance of the body 38 and views its bodily nature as essential to its thrownness for he later writes, "Dasein is thrown, factical, thoroughly amidst nature through its bodiliness" (Heidegger,1984, p 166). The 'problem' of Dasein's body is directly related to its spatiality for as Heidegger (1962) explains:

Dasein does not fill up a bit of space as Real Thing or item of equipment… so the boundaries dividing it from the surrounding space would themselves just define that space spatially. Dasein takes space in… It is by no means just present-at-hand at a position in space which its body fills up… Neither may Dasein's spatiality be interpreted as an imperfection which adheres to existence by reason of the fatal linkage of the spirit to the body… On the contrary, because Dasein is 'spiritual' [Geistig] and only because of this, it can be spatial in a way that remains essentially impossible for any extended corporeal thing (p.419).

Although Heidegger (1962) continues with the foundational nature of temporality over spatiality, Dasein's body is essentially produced by its Being-in-the-world, through Care and temporality. The Being of Dasein, as embodied and spatial, is determined through its spirituality (Geistig) for its orientation in space, to "things and places in its environment or region, depend on the articulation of spatiality in and through its own body" (Malpas, 2008, p.130). To summarize once again, Heidegger (1962) maintains that Dasein's spatiality is not a matter of the body, but of existence. Directionality of distance is founded on Being-in-the-world. "Left' and 'right' are not subjective for which the subject has a 'feeling;' they are directions of one's directedness into the world that is 'ready-to-hand' already" (Heidegger, 1962, p.144). Orientation is dependent on an understanding of simultaneously presented regions of space and of the 'ordering' of these regions (Malpas, 2008) and varies depending on the located individual and more particularly from the way the individual body is positioned in space and with respect to its surroundings. The ordering of "space the body was 'in' was also an ordering of the space of the body" (Malpas, 2008, p.128, emphasis added). At issue then is space in relation to the body; for insomuch as it is a prerequisite of orientation, embodiment becomes a pre-requisite (Arisaka, 1995; Baiasu, 2007; Malpas, 2008) for Being- in- the-world.

a) Existential Spatiality on Functions within Care

As spatiality and embodiment are tied together, the role of the body is not indicative of corporeality as a feature of Dasein's existence (Geistig) but rather of its fundamental spatiality; to be embodied is to exist in space (Malpas, 2008). Studies in Ableism highlights several issues within internalized ableism that suggests Dasein with an Impairment is constantly dealing with ordered regions and the devaluation of its position both existentially through Care (self) and as existence. The silent message "that one is an accident that ought not to have happened" (Mairs, 1996, p.112) and constant social disgust, disregard and issues of stigma and shame have resulted in 'defensive othering,' which has seen marginalized individuals generally attempting to emulate the hegemonic norm. This effect legitimizes the 'devalued identity imposed by das Man, through the implied sentiment that "there are indeed others to whom this applies, but it does not apply to me" (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock, 1996, p.425).

Overboe (1999) in discussing the social pressure on Dasein with an Impairment to emulate the norm, argues that the "naturalness of the notion of the abled-bodied, liberal individual coupled with the negation of a disabled sensibility ma[de] many disabled people queue for the chance to be appointed as 'people first' whilst simultaneously disavowing their previously embodied positions" (p.24). Campbell (2009) took this argument further in discussing 'ableist passing' which resulted in not only Dasein with an Impairment hiding its impairment or morphing disability but involved das Man failing to ask about 'difference,' an inconvenient activity, which doubtlessly disturbed the peace of its civil society. Embodiment as a function of space requires acknowledgement and acceptance that bodily space is not that, which simply fills 'bits' of world-space but rather belongs to Dasein's activity as the space of action and therefore not construed in terms of objectivity or its physical identity. As a culture then Heidegger (2001) claims we:

Need to grasp the difference between 'lived-body' and 'body.' For instance when we step on a scale we do not weigh our 'lived-body' but merely the weight of our [individual] 'body.' Or further the limit of the 'lived body' is not the limit of the 'body.' The limit of the 'body' is the skin…The limit of the 'lived-body' is more difficult to determine. It is not 'world' but it is perhaps just as little 'environment' (p.113-14).

Toombs (1995) graphically details the problems involved in the lived-body of Dasein with an Impairment through its interaction with thoughtless and often dismissive normative social customs:

For a person who routinely used a wheelchair, the device becomes part of the body…becomes an extension of one's bodily range. Thus when a stranger pushes my wheelchair without my permission, it is invading my personal space (p.18).

Yet as Studies in Ableism indicates, the undifferentiated (The They) maintain the status quo. The legitimacy of subjectivity of 'the body' remains common and provides for an exiled state (example: the process of welfare) as Mairs (1996) in frustration claims that life was "permanently exiled from normality" (p.126) while the need to repair / renew the corporeality of Dasein with an Impairment continues at the pleasure (Campbell, 2009) and whim of the sociality.

b) Dependence of Equipment Spatiality on Existential Spatiality

This second area of dependant relations; equipment spatiality (the prior public ordering of things, place and region) and existential spatiality (Dasein's individual interaction and engagement of such public ordering through distance and directionality) has been historically interpreted to suggest that equipmental space was only proper or authentic insomuch as it was related to Dasein's individual activity (Baiasu, 2007). Malpas (2008) maintains however that orientation is inclusive of all impact to any particular object. 39 In broad terms, Imrie (1996) asserts that space was organized to perpetuate the dominance of das Man. Environments (or public space) that excluded were not 'natural' but produced through social interaction (de-severance) combined with state and building regulation, architectural and civil planning to render no-go areas (Kitchin 2007) or 'design apartheid.' In relation to this discussion, the ordering of disabled individuals has been partly determined by the way society was geared to understand disability through a range of activities centred on marginalization. Yet any such 'equipmental ordering' is realized and maintained through normative processes and the disabled individual's own engagement with ableist perspectives and societal expectations.

Gleeson (1996) also considers a dual interpretation of space in terms of its passive 'containment' (world-space) of life and inclusive 'involvement' of social relations and claimed that in relation to Dasein with an Impairment, such involvement has historically become 'zones' of containment and exclusion. Ableism suggests such dissociation or obstruction affirms disability as the negative duality of social position through the "politics of fixed difference" (Campbell, 2009, p.145). Heidegger (1962) argues that the 'equipmental system' presupposes public access and the creation of 'private space' required locking which drew attention to and defined the Being-with of Dasein with an Impairment. The resulting privileging of public space allowed das Man to interpret its presence as being-amongst or being-alongside and thus encouraged distance and exploitation (Malpas 2008). Campbell (2009) uses the example of disabled parking zones in discussions of "the 'cripping' {sic} of social landscapes through such 'anomalous zones" (p.141) and concluded that the exclusivity and containment of disability through such moral 'accommodation' did little more than delineate Dasein with an Impairment from its community through the creation and maintenance of false impressions of allegiance. Yet "there [is] no insistence that others viewed our lives as ample or precious…we are not demanding that they be made perfect" (Mairs, 1996, p.106) in order to conform to society.

The identity of disability has been constructed and regulated by rules and practices that continually shape the encounter between Dasein with an Impairment and the 'gate-keepers' of institutional and political structures (Feazee, Gilmour and Mykitiuk, 2006). Critical Disability Studies, in analyzing its uneasy relationships with social institutions, discusses the patterns of these relationships formed by the boundaries of bureaucratic demand. Divided into three focus areas, studies have shown that the institutional gaze or perspective of assessment; dialogue, rules of engagement or selection and final judgments, often result in the public 'stripping' (Feazee et al 2006) of Dasein with an Impairment through the paternalistic pressures of conformity and powers of the 'normalizing' gaze to legitimize the present-at-hand interpretation of interactions (Krogh and Johnson, 2006). Further, Critical Disability Studies examinations continue to uncover the un-suitable 'landscape' of contemporary cities for Dasein with an Impairment as urban space has remained implicitly and explicitly designed to comply with abled-bodied normativity (Mathews and Vujakovic, 1995). Architecture and general urban planning has been accused of 'locking' out Dasein with an Impairment in line with the dominant ethos of the abled-bodied (Imrie 1996) community and state policies of integration and assimilation. Mairs (1996) laments the narrowed, discriminatory view of the sociality and highlights the economic absurdity and short sightedness of contemporary, communal 'structures:'

I ought to be admitted to any place to which the general populace commonly has access; restaurants, surely as well as banks, churches, theatres and cinemas, the post office, dry-cleaning shops, beauty salons and above all, the mall! You'd think that capitalist society would eagerly grasp this principle without legal intervention; the more goods and services I can readily access, the more likely I am to spend money. In reality, legislation has often been required to ensure access which has been slow to be established and still far from perfect (p.91).

The inadequacies of modern public transport, public conveniences and public spaces rendered Dasein with an Impairment's reliance on such communal infrastructure virtually impossible. The ever present inconvenience of blocked / no access has afforded independence of action as a function of its spatiality of existence rather than the right of freedom of existential spatiality (Kitchin, 2007; Toombs, 1995).

c) Dependence of Objective Spatiality on the Spatiality of the World

In the final dependant relation of space, bodily space suggests a mode of spatiality centred on the particular body (an active body rather than any abstract notion of subjectivity) rather than objective space centred neither on the body nor any one thing but rather things or objects as they stand apart from any particular body. Heidegger (1962) is correct in suggesting objective spatiality did not exhibit the kind of directionality that is a necessary element in the spatiality of Dasein but again Malpas (2008) reminds us that he was mistaken in consequently assuming such directionality was derived from temporality alone for the body has a directionality which is indeed relevant to the structure of Dasein's spatiality. Bodily space is always structured in terms 'relation to the body' and directionality whereas objective space lacks such centredness and consists of a multiplicity of equally ranked positions characterized as uniform. Arisaka (1995) maintains that regions have an indexical feature which are neither individual nor subjective but based on one's directed activity as the particular orientation of any Dasein. In offering such a frame of possibilities, regions provide exacting perspective and orientation and determine the way in which presence is disclosed to anyone "plugged into that region" (Arisaka, 1995, p.9). However, Dasein, in having its own sphere of de-severance, is not the result of self-centred bodily space but rather the regional determination of objective space which becomes an essential to Dasein's spatiality through its relatedness to the body-of-active engagement (Arisaka, 1995; Malpas, 2008). Again, translated to this discussion, contemporary society (objective space) offers a range of opportunities through the normative perspective of abled-bodiness and in doing so, determines the way in which otherness will be disclosed, addressed and interpreted within the wider community.

Social vulnerability is the result or function of the unpredictable cultural environment through the 'norming process' (Davis, 1995) and regulations of institutions of contemporary society. The nature of "compulsory 'abledness' and its conviction to and seduction of sameness as the basic to equality…results in a resistance to consider ontologically peripheral lives as distinct ways of Being…least they produce a heightened devaluation" (Campbell, 2009, p.131 emphasis added). Again Mairs (1996) reflects upon social reaction and irritated accommodation to her space:

I often feel constrained not to inflict my dreary condition upon the vigorous, as though I spoiled any party at which I showed up… As a rule the pressure is tactic; the slide of an eye in any direction but mine, the exasperated sigh…ever so slight at having to open a space for my wheelchair (p.101).

Removing disability to a place of difference effectively diminishes the individual and collective reality of Dasein with an Impairment (Michalko, 2009). Disability has remained silent in the social definition and cultural processes of das Man but as Michalko (2009) insists "it is present if we pause and listen…we can 'hear' the presence in its very absence" (p.68). Such silences were exposed in law's investment in the management of ableist delimitations of impairment (Campbell, 2009). Law has two orientations to Dasein with an Impairment; an axiomatic condition which relates externally to the society as an 'overcomer' or 'victim' and in ascertaining the limits or boundary of disability through "constituting subjectivity"(Campbell, 2009, p.133) which suggests "disability and impairment come together, circulating as discursive assemblages where psychic gestures of impairment are exchanged, relayed…counter-laid by the forces of normalcy that interpolate how [Dasein with an Impairment] was meant to be" (Campbell, 2009, p.133).

The shaping of social space becomes the function of who is made to feel welcome and connected (Sibley, 1995). Interaction by its very definition ascribes and conveys meaning, for the community is not just the buildings and infrastructure, it contains cultural text (Donald, 1992) which is interpreted and absorbed"

To know that one arouses fear and pity simply sickens the spirit of anyone, whether sound of limb and mind or not. One is tempted to withdraw altogether, at least from the company of 'normals', so as to avoid the indignity; but disappearance from the scene, however unwelcome to both parties, won't lead to change (Mairs, 1996, p.102).

Spatial structures, places and institutions provide through explicit and implicit symbolism, signifiers to identify and instruct Dasein's place and activity (Creswell, 1996). Effectively, social space has been 'socialized' by behaviours of the undifferentiated some of which Critical Disability Studies continues to reveal as discriminatory. For example the a) segregation of schools, employment and living spaces promoted as 'empowerment' and 'independence' has been exposed as a mechanism to simply perpetuate disableism (Minda, 1995) and b) the promotion of 'formal' or 'apparent' equality rather than substantive equality fundamentally maintains the systematic portrayal of 'victim' status for Dasein with an Impairment (Devlin and Pothier, 2006).

Moreover, liberalism through the lens of Critical Disability Studies, has significant issues to counter because its very foundations have efficiently and effectively constrained disability through the maintenance of normative assumptions which have presumed Dasein with an Impairment as 'misfortune' 40 and therefore required prevention; treatment / cure or at least rehabilitation in order to function within 'normal' society (Tremain, 2006). In its desire to abolish disability, to stop the 'suffering' 41 {sic} its paternalistic, budget restrained, welfare state equates 'equality' to the production of pity and charity rather than through the adoption of a human rights perspective that would have civil society reject these hierarchies of difference (Krogh and Johnson, 2006).

The political pre-occupation with the benefits of universality and capital growth in Western communities has entrenched the undifferentiated attitude of indifference in its desire for economic prosperity. This has provided for some others to be relegated and marginalized (present-at-hand) as the undifferentiated, in the clamour for profits drown out the space of authentic relationship. Mairs (1996) qualifies:

The mark of self-reliance for me is not whether or not I open a door for myself but whether I accept the burden of my limitations. For the truth is that regardless of structural and attitudinal modifications, I am never going to be at ease in the world (p.105).

Heidegger (1962) correctly asserts that one can only gain access to the objective and therefore disengagement through directionality and engagement, yet again is incorrect in the assumptions that directionality is derived from, or has a hierarchical dependence upon the engagement (Arisaka, 1995; Malpas, 2008). Critical Disability Studies, in arguing that difference cannot be ignored, pursues a politics of transformation as the relationship between the elements of situatedness is one of mutual dependence; the gathering of a multiplicity of Dasein into a heterogeneous, yet unified structure (Malpas, 2008). Malpas' (2008) perspective is convincing in arguing that "Heidegger's overall philosophy is that Dasein 'is' itself, the capacity to support different possible modes of disclosure which are part of the more 'basic gatheredness' of Dasein in the world" (p.141). Yet Heidegger (1962) is unfortunately not particularly clear that these different modes of disclosure are themselves in constant interplay, for indeed there is no 'detached' mode of existence.

Heidegger's (1962) theoretical development of space and spatiality then, reveals social culpability in reproducing, maintaining and constructing exclusionary frameworks. Marginalization cannot be understood without an appreciation of the socio-spatial processes of community and space as an active existential of Dasein exposes power relations which enforce and substantiate the 'othering' of minorities. By focusing on the primordial issue of Being rather than ableist notions of power and domination, Heidegger has offered a unique basis with which to consider 'disability' and the position of Dasein with an Impairment. The consistent and persistent domination of 'abled-bodiness' occurs in culturally produced environments which remain fundamentally defined and orchestrated by segregated and inaccessible spaces. Heidegger in unveiling the artificial nature of the distinction between actuality and potential provides the source of discriminatory practice, oppressive behaviour and affords the mechanism for a truly authentic life through the acceptance of difference and responsibility for the lived experience of all others.


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  1. Heidegger's world: While willing to concede that the physical universe is best considered through natural science, Heidegger is insistent that there is another legitimate and valid way to imagine and explore the 'world' as a function of the manner and style of organizing relationships and activities with things and individuals around us. Considered in this manner, the world does not provide an appropriate foundation or underpinning for any definition constructed through the methodology of physical sciences. Rather the interpretation needs to be constructed through an approach which would allow for access to and experiencing of things it presents and highlights. For Heidegger then, the world cannot be reduced to a simple collection of things or specific circumstances for it represents a phenomenon where one understands, makes sense, gives structure, organizes ever thing one encounters in everyday life, making it possible to act, think and experience things in the world. 'Understanding' here does not mean knowing particular facts or propositions. Heidegger insists that any recognition or interpretation has its being in the act of comprehension; it is not something one possesses but rather something one does. True understanding of a world lies not in knowledge and capacity to present fact but rather in the knowing how to live within it. The individual's (i.e Dasein) understanding is found in the manner, behaviour and approach that an individual engages with things and others. Further the structure of the world is articulated in terms of differing action; the roles, purpose, possibilities and methods of organizing one's life available within a culture. Individuals share the same world, even in application and participation in different roles and aspirations for all actions intertwine to support the other. However the space of such possibilities isn't measurable or interpretable through physical / traditional scientific study. Heidegger maintains that to the extent that our acceptance, respect and admiration of physical, traditional science encourages society to dismiss anything that cannot be scientifically proven or theorized, the sociality remains at risk of overlooking the world for it becomes impossible to appreciate the self, for the world is the foundation of how one acts and relates the one's surroundings (Wrathall, 2006).
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  2. Dasein: A German word, literally translated, means 'being- there' and in general terms denotes a human being's existence or living. Heidegger exploits its conventional meaning and draws attention to what he demands is the essential relation; human being and being itself. This reflexive selfhood is a process more fundamental than cognitive self-awareness or moral accountability. Heidegger is adamant that there is a difference between Dasein and empirical sciences such as psychology, biology, anthropology and / or 'common sense.' Heidegger's writing avoids all conventional language that may insinuate presupposition from such domains related to 'subject,' 'ego' or 'person' making it clear that 'to be' an existing or concrete 'particular' differs from human and / or non-human entities. Indeed the essence of Dasein is not to be found in physiological attributes but in existence, for 'everything we call our bodiliness … down to the last muscle fibre and most hidden molecules of hormones [already] belongs essentially to existing' (Heidegger, 2001, p.232). Aho (2009, p.13) clarifies, "Dasein is this happening of understanding and existence...the unique way that human beings understands or interprets [one's] life within a shared socio-historical context" (emphasis added). Dasein as a term is meant to capture the way in which we are already concretely involved in the world, in an average socio-historical understanding of things and unable to disengage or escape. Human beings in their way of being, embody an understanding of what it is 'to be' (Dreyfus, 1991) Thus within this paper the capitalization / italics of Being is used as a mechanism to remind readers of Dasein's specification.
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  3. Being-in-the-world: Heidegger argues that we are basically engrossed and absorbed in the world. Such a comment has, for the most part, been veiled within more traditional philosophy as its focus remains tied to self consciousness /moral accountability experienced independently of the world and social interaction. However Heidegger's phenomenological approach to the notion of 'self' is focussed on one fundamental self disclosure: "I am what matters to me" (Blattner, 2006, p.41) for one cannot disentangle or extricate oneself from others or the world. The phrase Being-in-the-world represents this basic structure or constitution. The Being-in that constitutes one's Being-in-the-world represents familiarity (Vertrautheit) rather than consciousnesses / moral accountability (Blattner, 2006).
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  4. Being-with: Individuals, in daily activities, encounter other people (Dasein) with their own personal interpreting /understanding of surroundings, possibilities, identity and mood. Many of one's activities involve or engage these others. This Being-with is an existential constitute of Being-in-the-world for "so far as Dasein 'is' at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being (Heidegger, 1962, p.163, emphasis added). Further, Heidegger (1962) considers the 'everyday' Being-with associated with the function of social normativity (das Man - refer En 10) and maintains observations, explanations or common values represented by comments such as, 'that's just the way it is done,' have an implied or a veiled 'should' or embedded social directive. In general, individuals relate to others through a common interpretation or perception of one's self, in term of what is normal or ordinary for the community ('The They'- refer En 8). Therefore the role of social relations is noteworthy in identifying one's individuality, or self, because one is continually bombarded with particular understandings of the world even prior to personal reflection or decision. Heidegger points out; one is never in a position to decide for oneself, to understand, determine things or invent my own way of Being-in-the-world independent to one's relationships with others within the world. Everything encountered, everything one does, is informed by the fact that one has to inhabit a shared world essentially structured by others. Therefore to understand the space of Dasein, one needs to remember that one's comprehension and explanation of the world is initially interpreted and dictated by others. Yet one can, within limits, arrive at one's own authentic (refer En 9) understanding of the world (Wrathall, 2006).
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  5. Care: (Sorge): The most characteristic / central feature of human life. Comprised of three complex existential structures - facticity (Faktizitat), possibility (Möglichkeit) and fallenness (Werfallen) - to provide understanding of the unique manner in which Dasein exists. This self-reflective is restricted to the 'selfhood' of the particular individual and correlates with the three aspects of temporality - past, present and future-to expose the completeness of existence through Being and Time (Lewis 2005; Tuttle 2005). a) Facticity refers to the 'fact' that Dasein always finds itself in a situation. Heidegger uses the terminology thrownness (Geworfenheit) for Dasein is 'thrown' in a world (at birth) and is always already in a world. Dasein's consideration of possibilities is dependent upon the structures of the society, involved not simply through instrumentality but the differential relations of significance and anonymity in the world (Lewis, 2005). This anonymity provides for the function of differentiation, of indifference, which allows Dasein to take refuge (to varying degrees) in the inauthentic (refer En 9) representations in terms of things of nature or components (Blattner, 2006). b) Possibility refers to Dasein's active comportment towards possibilities, dreams and expectations. However such understanding is not a 'mental state' nor simply a 'possibility' to be seen in terms of 'actual possibilities,' rather it is the 'ground' or that which determines, the 'possibility of possibilities' c) Fallennesss expresses Dasein's average 'everydayness;' one's interest and engagement in the world of everyday concerns and projects. At this level concrete manifestation (thrownness) and understanding (possibility) usually operate (Lewis, 2005; Tuttle, 2005).
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  6. Disclosedness: Individuals, in the first instance, are selves who understand and interpret through public communication and expression of the world and set out to explore this familiarity by considering what it is to be in-a-world? What is Being-in? Heidegger (1962) answers: To 'be' in-a-world, is for the world to be 'disclosed' to an individual and insists language such as 'consciousness,' 'experience' or 'awareness,' invoke traditional philosophical interpretation which implies a subject-object mode of being within the world. In offering this alternative expression Heidegger avoids the 'baggage 'of consciousness and /or intentionality directed towards the world and highlights the world as being disclosed to us. Remember, one's such fundamental experience or familiarity is not as subjects standing over or against objects for one experiences the 'self' as at home in the world; engrossed and wrapped up in, rather than just absorbed in, one's relationship with the world. One's sense of identity cannot be disentangled from the surrounding environment. The 'self' is what matters in living, for one is implicated in society- a phenomenology of the familiar (Blattner, 2006).
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  7. Situation: Designates the difference between existing in a concrete situation and the existential Being-in-the-world because Dasein is in the world continually engaging and interpreting with other entities in the context, circumstance and framework in which they are preset. Indeed the "spatiality of Dasein is never i) reduced to an extension of things (because the way Dasein occupies space is fundamentally different from things) nor ii) defined by citing the position [Stelle] at which some corporeal thing is present-at-hand, for whereas the space of things in the world remain determined in respect of its 'position,' Dasein does not occupy space in this manner." Thus Dasein's distinctive way of taking space is the Situation. Keep in mind then, that the spatiality or ‘placedness’ of Situation is not a fundamental representation of anthropological space’ and needs to be distinguished from inauthentic spatiality of The They (refer En 8) which Heidegger calls the general situation (Lage) (Malpas 2008). Dasein exists in the world not only with things but also with-others and all Heidegger's basic features concerning Dasein are existential ie concerned with the search for Dasein's Being (Wollan, 2003).
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  8. The They: Contemporary society, in its apparent desire for an increasingly normalized state, has become progressively more resistant and intolerant of peculiarity, idiosyncrasy and the unconventional. Heidegger is concerned with the related dangers of conformism but accepts that the tendency towards such normalized behaviour is not something to be totally eliminated, for it is an essential component of humankind. Using the terminology 'The They' Heidegger draws attention to the Being-with in a particular mode - the 'everyday' being-with-one-another. Generally, individuals relate to each other in terms of what one says about the way one should live; in terms of what one ordinarily does in any given situation. In other words, social relations play a role in deciding who the individual becomes. For prior to any conscious thought, people with whom one lives, have already introduced one to a particular understanding of the self and the world. One is never in a position to decide for oneself how to interpret things growing up, or invent one's own way of being in the world independently of relationships with others. Every thought, decision, mood or indeed rebellious action is shaped through shared understanding and norms of behaviour. Heidegger reminds us that everything one encounters, every action one executes is informed to varying degrees by the shared environment (Wrathall, 2006). Blattner (2006) maintains Heidegger's concern and attention is in establishing that, what and how things are at issue for us, as individuals, are governed by the social patterns in which we function. Our individual existence is fundamentally structured by others. Dasein lives in a with-world, therefore one's interpretation and engagement is always initially dictated by others. Such patterns in contemporary society are considered patterns of social normativity (Refer En 10). However one can, within limits, arrive at an authentic (counter to average) understanding of the world (Refer En 9).
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  9. Inauthenticity / Authenticity: As discussed, Heidegger (1962) argues that others play a decisive role in determining or disclosing one's essence, one's Being, The fundamental experience of others - one's experience of "those who proximally and for the most part 'are there' in everyday being-with-others" (p.164) - is having one's basic possibilities for Being dictated by and through social norms; its possibilities, trappings and 'baggage.' For Heidegger there is no definitive answer to the question of an independent self. Even if one were able to identify / point to a particular individual or group responsible for particular trends etc. there is no way to isolate those responsible for any practice becoming a dominant cultural custom, convention or institution within the sociality. However Heidegger suggests the domination of common understanding might be traced back to the structuring of the public world. Entities, behaviour and activity are aligned to foster particular responses, routines, norms, temperament, alienation or discouragement. Engaging things in one's surrounding provides for a subtle introduction of habit, practice and disposition that is shared with others because, they too, have learned such responses. Heidegger (1962, p.165, original emphasis) asserts this to be the "dictatorship of The They." For "we take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure: we read, see and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the great masses as they shrink back, we find shocking what they find shocking. The 'they,' which is nothing definite and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribe the kind of being of everydayness." Thus the sociality shares a sense for the range of opinions and activities that are permissible in the common world and what constitutes 'achievement' in life. Heidegger does not rebuff / eliminate conformity on all levels for having a settled, normalized or standard set of practices, processes and / or expectations and options provides the opportunity to consider important decisions. However Heidegger's fundamental position is that surrender to conformity leads to consequences the sociality might not want to embrace- a conformism in which it becomes too difficult to take a stand against / to defy or rebel against, in order to experience oneself, to disburden oneself so that one is not oneself at all, but rather 'The They.' This conformism is inauthenticity (Wrathall, 2006). Authenticity is the condition of existence that is Being in which one takes responsibility for oneself, the counter-possibility to being lost in The They, indeed the owning of who and how one 'is' (Blattner, 2006). Heidegger suggests that authenticity, experiencing oneself as isolated from others, is atypical for such individuation is a momentary clear-sighted confrontation with the anxiety of one's own death (being-towards-death) and retrieval of one's singular circumstance (thrownness). Aho (2009) suggests it is the social potential of shared history fundamentally ignored by convention and traditional assumptions, intolerance and discrimination of current times.
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  10. das Man: Is the phenomenon of social normativity; 'The They' in everyday activity. This mode of Being allows for the 'levelling' of society. The desire for anonymity, need for uniformity and imposition of conformity provide for only a possibility of existence, and tends to disguise or conceal the ontological fact that we are thrown into the world which is Being-towards-death (the ultimate possibility).
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  11. Dasein with an Impairment: Is my constructed identification of disabled persons (generally) with relation to Heidegger's Dasein. The paper is not using the person-first rhetoric as used within recent disability discourse for the generally accepted terminology 'person with a disability' fails to consider the complexity of social / political oppression. The perception that disabled people are 'just people' while seductive negates the expression of life of disabled people who fail to meet such categorization (Overboe, 2007). However, as Dasein is an individual process of 'Being' this terminology is offered as a compromise in the attempt to avoid misunderstanding / misrepresentation and confusion of terminology within current discourse.
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  12. Studies in Ableism (SiA): Is a network of beliefs processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as the perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human. Disability, then, is cast as a diminished state of being human (Campbell, 2001, p.44).
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  13. Mairs N (1996) Waist High in the World; Life among the nondisabled. Boston: Beacon Press. Having written extensively through her twenty year struggle with Multiple Sclerosis, the well-travelled poet, teacher, mother and activist has brought readers into the intimacy of her life. The textual inserts in representing the commonality of the human experience offer a counterbalance "the poignant message of defiance, courageous determination and survival in a society ingrained with discriminatory practices and historical prejudice against disabled people and where normalization and 'moral health" (Mairs, 1996, p.57) are defended by physical pathology, cultural expectation and biotechnology. The reality of Mairs' discussion highlight the social constraints and interaction of the power of the imposing 'voices' of das Man through Critical Disability Studies and Studies in Ableism by "consider[ing] the character of the world and the nature of human existence" (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2005, p.4).
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  14. Solicitude: Heidegger's existential sense of self is far more basic that any feeling connected to moral accountability or subjectivity for one's life, one's Being, is who one is and just who one is, includes and permeates how one feels, acts, talks, behaves and indeed with whom one congregates and associates. Heidegger (1962) argues that one cannot detangle who one is from those others in proximity. In caring about whom one is, one cares about others. This Care of others is solicitude. The intimacy of one's concern with others varies from disengaged indifference to deep commitment and while one generally does not rigorously distinguish oneself from fellow individuals in daily pursuits, it still matters to one's Being. For example in being aware of and living for- the- sake-of being a mother, I am also living for- the- sake-of my children, as children. In realizing a specific way of Being a mother I am also realizing a specific way of their Being children (Blattner, 2006).
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  15. Heidegger's only reference to disabled people (a disabled potter) occurs in his writings on potential (1995). The disabled potter's 'readiness' 'to be' should be interpreted as potential, considered through the 'amputation of power' for although the potter was no longer capable of physical production his potential remained. Heidegger suggests the "potter's capability was still actual … merely cannot pass into actuality" a privation that humankind has excluded in the consideration of reality of power (Greaney, 2007, p.6). The potter's ability has been transformed into potential which Heidegger (1995) insists needs reflection.
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  16. Refer back to (En 7) on 'Situation'
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  17. It is acknowledged that Heidegger's later writing reversed this priority when discussing space and time as constituents of clearing (revealing) of Being. This subsequent change in thinking is known as the Kehre. The author, however, in developing this argument has taken position presented by Malpas (2008) that the famous 'shift' as the single development of philosophical thought (1930-46) rather than a change or rejection of previous theory. It represents a change in focus from consideration of Being as relating to human individuals (Dasein) to Being considered on its own terms. Heidegger himself rejected the notion that the 'turning' is something manufactured or peculiar to his personal biography (Malpas, 2008).
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  18. c.f. Heidegger 1962, §54, 79.
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  19. Concept in line with Aristotle's "being-in-a-place" (Malpas, 2008, p.68).
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  20. It is necessary to remember that Heidegger's writing is not concerned with a traditional cognition or visual focus on an object's value to an individual but rather its familiarity to the individual in question. For example consider a desk in one's study. One is familiar with it as a desk, not a rectangular piece of furniture that also has a use in one's life. Indeed consider just how familiar one is with entities in one's personal environment without necessarily being able to describe them neutrally. Just what colour is this desk in one's study, what is the colour or shape of one's phone? The answer doesn't come immediately, for one's relationship or familiarity to these pieces is not through neutral description with value-added, but through their role in one's activity. "Heidegger asserts that seeing use-objects as neutral, value free entities with value-added on, requires an artificial stance towards them a ...holding back from manipulation" (Blattner, 2006, p. 53) so he appropriates the word, equipment, to represent entities that appear in one's everyday activities. Such entities are not merely things present-at-hand, occurring in one's life but rather, as a referential function, are at one's disposal, ready-to-hand through involvement.
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  21. c.f. Heidegger 1962, §101-113.
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  22. c.f. Heidegger 1962, §101-113.
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  23. It must be remembered that such 'situatedness' or being-in is not a noun or thing but activity and transitivity-corresponding to the manner by which Dasein is understood.
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  24. If one returns to the 'desk' example (En22): when one walks from the study where the desk is situated into the lounge room, one is not, according to Heidegger's theory, changing location in an 'arena' or world space perception. One actually' takes- in' space as one moves, continuously making the 'farness' of the lounge room disappear or 'vanish' as the shifting spatial perspectives are opened as one moves.
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  25. Arisaka (1995) explains further; regions 'refer' to one's activities as they are established by one's way of Being and individual activities. These activities in turn are defined in terms of regions, for only through regions can one's de-severance and directionality be established. An individual's objects of concern always appear in certain place and context, in certain directions. In Heideggerian terms then, Dasein constantly orientates itself and its activities within regions which therefore must already be given to Dasein.
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  26. c.f. Heidegger 1962, § 111.
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  27. Distantiality: Heidegger in emphasizing the existence of social normativity, explores its function phenomenologically through the notion of 'deviance' and how society responds to it. Heidegger calls humankind's reaction and concern about deviance: distantiality. As Blattner (2006) and Malpas (2008) argue, deviance is conspicuous and disturbing to the sociality. Generally with both individuals and community, there is a desire to suppress any form of deviance through direct or subtle instruction. Such suppression often involves open conflict, argument or violence for as a society we treat others, considered different or inappropriate, with suspicion and / or fear. The habitual suppression of deviance Heidegger refers to as subjection and this distantiality belongs with, is that Dasein, as everyday being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to others (Heidegger, 1962, p.164). As a society, the suppression of deviance on the part of others leads to suppression of the self. Consider any street in any local town and reflect upon how similar individual males or females are dressed. This resemblance, likeness, or normalness Heidegger calls 'averageness' and such averageness through suppression of deviance diminishes not only the bizarre, strange or unusual but also impedes otherness, the capacity to be individual and tramples over achievement.
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  28. F. Kumari Campbell, personal communication 9th September 2009.
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  29. Refer page 44... Kant, I. (1991)
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  30. c.f. Heidegger, 1962,§122
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  31. Civil society: Is a society constituted by social contract. A rationally developed mechanism forming social relationships characterized by the impersonal association between people and held together through common goals which are of interest to all there. Yet as Malpas (2008) maintains the social ordering of social life is not merely a contingent fact about being-there or commonality for "essential to the grasp of properly social, life is a grasp of the very concept of otherness and to grasp this is to grasp the very possibility of an existence that is both similar to my own existence and yet nevertheless different from it" (p.88).
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  32. Resoluteness: In resolute disclosedness, existence relates to and understands itself on the basis that existence is always / essentially towards its own death. Death is the ultimate possibility for Dasein, the absolute limit that marks the point at which existence begins and ends. In existing, Dasein is always relating to its own end. This end is not the point at which existence ends but the closure of the defining horizon from which existence is born at every moment. In resoluteness, Dasein does not flee its mortality but anticipates it, brings it to bear on its comportment towards the world. Indeed as Heidegger (1962) explains, "resoluteness brings the self directly into its current concernful being amidst the available and thrusts it into solicitous being-with others" (p.298). To be resolute, one owns up to the concrete situation in which one finds oneself and understanding one's Being unequivocally as one's own. Resoluteness then reveals Dasein as essentially futural, accepting Being in terms of its directedness towards its own end. The essence of humankind is therefore futural; existence is always and essentially to come rather than the traditional understanding of time as originating in the present. Dasein is always coming towards itself, whether it understands itself 'properly' on the basis of its ownmost possibility 'to be' in authentic existence or whether it understands itself 'improperly' as a reality, simply present in inauthentic existence.
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  33. Heidegger (1962) consistently refrains from specifying the actual content of Dasein's possibilities because such is always gathered [or satisfied] from the particular community into which Dasein has been thrown. It is critical to understand that, according to Heidegger (1962) our fate is guided rather than determined in advance, by our society. "The destiny of our community is free, if and only if, Dasein is able to contest or affirm, even struggle for or against, the direction such a community takes" (Salem- Wiseman, 2003, p.544).
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  34. Fürsorge: The element of the complex existential structure, Care, which manifests in relation to Other beings' as 'solicitude.' Taking the form of 'Being-with', it comprises an inauthentic mode or leaping-in (dominating /taking control) and the authentic mode of leaping -ahead (guidance through consideration and tolerance).
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  35. Besorge: The element of the complex existential structure, Care, which manifests in relation to things 'ready-to-hand' (zuhanden) as concern. As an individual and society, one is 'concerned' with all that surrounds and confronts us; one is neither indifferent nor submissive in relation to such things, for even in neglect or avoidance they matter to everything one 'is' and 'does.'
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  36. Refer also Foucault (1977) re negative underside of law-discipline
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  37. While acknowledging the enormity of discrimination within the workplace (worldspace) the limitation of 'space' for this paper prevents detailed argument.
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  38. Embodiment was absent from discussions in Being and Time (1962) due to the problematic of situatedness. The structural hierarchical dependence on temporality, central to the work created a contradiction in analysis as Dasein; either had a body as a matter of extended spatiality and thus no different from present-at-hand or it was essentially determined by its being-in-the-world and so being-as care and temporal. Refer: Seguna, J. (2014) for elaboration of Heidegger as an embodied philosophy
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  39. To use a Heideggerian example; to fully grasp a hammer, to use it in the function of hammering, one would need to understand the way it related spatially to surrounding things as well as the individual using the hammer.
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  40. Term used in relation to MacPherson's (2006) discussion of Liberalism's ideology
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  41. Term used in relation to Devlin and Pothier's (2006) discussion of Liberalism's ideology and policies of abolition of disability; supposed processes of empowerment
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