The production and knowledge of space is a vital element of contemporary Western society. A relational exercise of power largely determines position and quality of life. The development and interest into the geography and theoretical analysis of space has created scholarship into the significance of social space, the embodiment of space and the social construction of spatiality. Marginality and exclusion function through the exercise of power co-ordinated by means of the cultural, political, economic and spatial organization of society. Such disabled 'relations' are produced at the intersection of self and other, self and self and self and objects through the negotiation of power structures in everyday experiences. Traditionally space has been considered from three general theoretical positions; absolutist, relationist and Kantian perspectives which according to Heidegger (1962) are grounded in the metaphysical subject / object dichotomy. Heidegger's (1962) notion of human existence is not one of subjectivity but intimately bound to the nature of world itself. 1 Indeed in suggesting the nature and character of 'space' was a condition of individual experience, Heidegger (1962) claims its essentiality to Dasein's 2 Being and involvement in the world. The theoretical concept attempts to re-describe spatial experience without assuming / taking for granted, objective space by unfolding the lived space within the finite perspective of individual Being.

Humankind is not 'in space' as an object but as a mode of existence and Dasein's existential (of / or pertaining to one's Being) characteristic is inclusive of every aspect of its Being-in-the-world 3 with others 4 and not just the 'self' (Care) 5. Dasein's understanding of 'others' reality through the concept of space offers the chance for the elimination of social boundaries. Heidegger's (1962) interpretation allows for new considerations of existence in relation to categorization, labelling and the exile of those outside the ideal or mass society.

This paper, by explaining the nature of space, will highlight Dasein's unique Being-with through familiarity (disclosedness) 6 as distinct from objective placement. For where the space of things remains linked to position and 'containment,' distance and closeness, low and high, inside and outside are lived realities of 'involvement.' Dasein's spatiality or Situation 7 is a primordial concept offering signification within-the-world as distinguished from our collective reliance on social conformity (The They) 8 and averageness of interpretation (inauthenticity) 9 which has Dasein losing itself through the ongoing experience or phenomenon of social normativity (das Man). 10 By considering the structures of space: de-severance, directionality and regionality, the relationship of the individual (Care) and the existential nature of space will be established to assist with the development of discussions involving contemporary issues of space as it relates to Dasein with an Impairment 11 in broad terms. This analysis will explore specific social and economic circumstances by focusing the analysis on Critical Disability Studies and the evolving Studies in Ableism. 12 The inclusion of autobiographical commentaries and reflections by Nancy Mairs (1996) 13 will present a practical demonstration and interpretation of significant points of Heidegger's (1962) writing and offer the embodied, first-person 'reality' of the disabled individual through a pragmatic engagement with-in the world in order to offset the prevailing hegemonic view that privileges abled-ness (Overboe, 2009) and the logic or space of binary oppositions. For while Heidegger (1962) does not interpret space and its interaction with the negative modes of solicitude 14 in relation to disability per se, 15 his thoughts undoubtedly describe contemporary reality. Exclusion, institutionalization, social demands, segregation and isolation through disabled 'zones,' 'permits' and official requirements have become increasingly intrusive and discriminatory to Dasein with an Impairment particularly in dealings with das Man.

Material exploitation and physical marginality of disabled people have been historically achieved and reproduced through discriminatory mainstream cultures and political structures (Gleeson, 1999). In Western contemporary society, disabled people are still allowed to suffer the inhumanity characterized through universal service delivery, dispassionate institutional interaction and impersonal 'classifications' for inclusion in the community (Michalko, 2009). Such marginalization situates the disabled person as the 'object' of inquiry and fails to provide non-disabled individuals the connection to their experience (Gleeson, 1999). Yet Heidegger's (1962) Being-with necessitates such in order to promote one's own-most possibilities. Deterministic beliefs and the medicalization of disability have provided for the examination of impairment and functional limitations as the identification of Dasein with an Impairment over the more complex and nuance experience of its lived-experience (Linton, 1998) As Mairs (1996) comments:

Blindness, deafness, intellectual impairment all qualify as 'disabilities' (or 'differing abilities' to people with merely mouths) but the circumstances they impose are nothing like mine…I'm not denying the seriousness of my situation but I think it's very important to distinguish 'disability' which is a social construction rather than a medical diagnosis from some of the circumstances associated with it often by people with little or no knowledge of the physical and mental limitations and their consequences (p.13).

Heidegger's (1962) interpretation of space clearly underscores disability as merely a product of interpretive social processes. Its discriminatory nature, the consequence of habitual cultural and political power and thinking (Michalko, 2009), is maintained by preserving divisions between the normal and 'others.' Michalko (2009) argues that disability is perceived as trouble; a 'thing' inconvenient and problematic to society, which Western society simply handed to medicine for diagnose through Foucault's (1973) 'clinical gaze. By classification as a 'thing,' undifferentiated das Man has ignored the possibility of conceiving disability as an existentially legitimate and valued embodied difference (Michalko, 2009) for 'The They' (in the desire for social conformity) know only the general situation (Lage) 16 (abled-bodiness) in familiar space and 'making room' for others has remained subjective. Heidegger (1962) though, offers a new method of understanding Dasein's spatiality, as grounded and disclosed in Being-in-the world.

Heidegger and Spatiality

Unfortunately, Heidegger's (1962) theory and discussion on space, while an essential component of Being-in-the-world, has been largely disregarded as a potentially constructive theme for deliberation. This is partly the consequence of Heidegger's early presentation or treatment designating space as of secondary importance and dependent upon time. 17 A great deal of academic commentary has effectively accepted the apparently 'evident' lesser significance of space and dismissed the subject as worthy of consideration or application. However the analysis of this paper will re-cast and reconstruct the original undertaking in line with arguments presented by Arisaka (1996; 1995), Baiasu (2007), Malpas (2008) and Vallega (2003) in suggesting spatiality is a co-original constituent with temporality and therefore fundamental to Dasein's existence. As Arisaka (1996) and Baiasu (2007) maintain, space and time are equipmordial (or equally fundamental, primordial) rather than foundational (where space is dependent upon time). This non-hierarchical, non-conditional relationship remains mutually interdependent for interactions with others (Mitda-sein) and things for Dasein and the world are equal existential (pertaining to one's Being) constituents of its reality.

In his development of Dasein, Heidegger (1990) claims that it is 'essentially "fettered in a body" (p.181) and therefore in a distinctly new relationship with the world (Casey, 1997) to that explained by Cartesian theory. While Descartes argues for the non-spatial ego, Heidegger (1962) contends spatiality is a defining characteristic of Dasein and as the concrete body, its bodily nature, presupposes the more primordial ground, not as a function of the mind but rather the body, for it occupies space (Situation) in an essentially different manner to 'things.' "Dasein…is spatial" (Heidegger, 1962, p.143) and relational through active involvement in the complexity and structure of things, places regions and other individuals (Malpas 2008). Mairs (1996) clearly highlights the complexity, involvedness and usefulness of Heidegger's interpretation of space, of Being, when describing her perceived marginalized 'place' and implied reality, or worth, within the wider sociality:

Regardless of the way marginality is conceived, it is never taken to mean that those on the margin occupy a physical space literally outside the field of vision of those in the centre, so that the latter trip unawares and fall into the laps of those who have been banished from consciousness unless these scoot safely out of the way. 'Marginality' thus means something altogether different to me from what it means to social theorists. It is no metaphor for the power relations between one group of human beings and another but literal description of the where I stand (figuratively speaking): over here, on the edge, out of bounds, beneath your notice. I embody the metaphor. Only whether or not I like doing so is immaterial (p.59).

The inhabited space of Dasein, its spatiality of Situation, has none of the common understanding or implications of space / place as it relates solely to the illumination of Being as an authentic existential dimension and its distinction from the inauthentic spatiality of 'The They' (Malpas, 2008). Mairs (1996) offers a clear explanation by suggesting that the "body occupies space and the quality of the space it occupies correlates to the condition of the soul" (p.57). In its undifferentiated state however, das Man is essentially closed-off from the condition of possibilities of cultural space for 'The They' lose itself in the generality of "opportunities, which are closest to it" (Heidegger, 1962, p.346). Such generalities, essentially discriminatory and marginalizing for all social minorities are confirmed by Mairs (1996) by suggesting:

The general public, [abledbodied sociality] have an easier time (or simply unconsciously prefer) dealing with people with disabilities by lumping us all together and assuming that we all have the same problem and, what is worse, that all we deal with or have in our life is our disability (p. 128).

Concepts defined

Heidegger's (1962) concept and explanation of space (proximity) distinguish three types of space: a) world-space, b) regions and c) spatiality of Dasein through de-severance (Ent-fernung) and directionality (Ausrichtung). World-space signifies space conceived or representative of a container or arena, of containment, and represents or captures the traditional and absolutist concept of space. 18 Chairs, doors, tables and buildings exist 'in' space, things, events happen 'in' space 19 but world-space is independent of such things and functions as a relational framework to the entities extended 'in' space (Arisaka, 1996; Malpas, 2008; Wollan, 2003). Heidegger (1962) calls such entities as present-at-hand because "they are of such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of 'being' is not of the character of Dasein" (p.79) but representative of an undifferentiated space within the physical universe and an abstraction from the primarily lived reality (Malpas, 2008; Wollan, 2003) and involvement of everyday activity.

Indeed the dismissal and invisibility of disabled individuals within the sociality is both persistent and ingrained. Mairs (1996) highlights the habitual, discriminatory nature of the space afforded her, to graphically underscore the pertinence and significance of Heidegger's theory to both Critical Disability Studies and Studies in Ableism by demonstrating her diminished, abstracted, state as merely present-at-hand:

Disability is at once a metaphorical and material state, evocative of other conditions in… space… Imprisonment comes to mind… I went to a luncheon honouring the Dalai Lama… [I] found [myself] in the hallway when the meeting room disgorged the workshop participants-all fourteen hundred of them… into a narrow area further constricted by tables laden with bells beads and brochures… no matter how persuaded they were of the beauty and sacredness of all life, not one of them seemed to think that any life was going on below the level of her or his gaze… 'Down here!' I kept whimpering at the hips and buttocks and bellies pressing my wheelchair on all sides. 'Down here! There is a person down here! My only recourse was to roll to one side and hug the wall (p.59).

Heidegger (1962) maintains everything an individual deals with or engages, is either near or far relative to that individual and therefore the understanding of such 'nearness' and /or 'farness' becomes how an individual familiarizes or learns to represent oneself as space. This 'proximity' is the basis of how humankind comes to represents itself, not through containment or objective measurement but as a state of Being. Yet again Mairs (1996), eloquent in asserting her personal perspective of the world, demonstrates the capacity of Heidegger's theory to question the alienation of the presupposed 'subjective' province of the abled-bodied experience:

I am literally diminished by my disability, reduced to a height of about 4' 8," consigned to gazing at navels (generally shrouded) other than my own. But diminution is not the whole of it. "Waist-high" also resonates "knee-deep." This is not piteously deprived state I'm in down here but a rich, complicated, and utterly absorbing process of immersion in whatever the world has to offer (p.18).

This notion of representation, of spatial proximity, is disclosed by Heidegger (1962) through the other two concepts; regions and spatiality. a) Regions or the space an individual engages in daily life, such as at home or in one's office, are considered to be equipment, (ready-to-hand) and organize and regulate one's activities and behaviour. 20 Regions differ from world-space (containers) for they provide a referential method to contextualize one's activities by determining a 'here' with respect to the one's movements and dealings with things (Arisaka 1995). In other words, regions are essentially organized by the activities that originate from a center of action. As Arisaka (1995) clarifies "the perspective presupposed in world-space is a standpoint of an infinite observer whereas the perspective in a region is a finite perspective of an acting agent "(p.4).

The second measure or concept of proximity within Heidegger's discussion, Dasein's spatiality 21, identifies the difference between the expression that 'one exists 'in' space' and the notion that 'one exists spatially' for as Heidegger asserts Dasein as spatial, "through care" a mode of one's existence (Heidegger, 1962, p.419); and defined through the existentials; de-severance (Ent-fernung) 22 and directionality (Ausrichtung). Dasein is 'in' the world through its involvement or dealings with entities within-the-world in a concerned and familiar manner. Spatiality belongs to Dasein through this Being-in (In-Sein), and presents the idea of situatedness. 23 Characteristically then, for Dasein to 'be' is for Dasein to dwell. Its situation or position in the world or environment cannot be separated from the reality of what it is, of what is close, familiar and already engaged (Malpas, 2008). De-severance describes how Dasein exists in a "process of self-determination by making things available" (Arisaka, 1996, p.37). Not simply a contemplative being, it exists through concrete action in-the-world; in making things available 'it takes-in space' by 'making the farness vanish' and 'bringing things close' (Heidegger, 1962, p.138). De-severance is not objective distance nor measured or calculated in objective terms but remains the manner or behaviour and urgency or necessity with which one encounters things (de Beistegui, 2005). Objective distance remains present-at-hand and does not relate to the remoteness or closeness of "what is ready-to-hand-within-the-world" (Heidegger, 1962, p.106). For example, in order to go somewhere, some place yonder, one might suggest it was 'a fairly long walk,' 'very close' or possibly suggest an exact time period for achievement or completion. However the intent or explanation is not a quantitative or exact measure but rather a qualitative dimension or interlude infused with the life and attitude of existence (de Beistegui, 2005). 24

Heidegger (1962) in identifying the second characteristic of spatiality, directionality, asserts that existence is always orientated towards things in a particular way, already engaged in this transitive activity of 'nearing' or 'bringing close' (Näherung) even if, or when, apparently unattainable or impossibly beyond one's reach (de Beistegui, 2005). As Arisaka (1996) and de Beistegui (2005) explain, in reaching for entities ready-to-hand and going to places, "shifting spatial perspectives are created" (Arisaka, 1996, p.37) through the inherently directional process. Every de-servering is focused towards something or a certain direction as determined by Dasein's 'concern' or perspective and movement into specific regions. Such directions, which "Dasein takes with it, are inscribed within its very body, as this lived body" (de Beistegui, 2005, p.67). De-serverance, directionality and regionality then together represent the equipmordial components of spatiality (Arisaka, 1996) in a 'unified' Being-in-the-world. 25 de Beistegui (2005) qualifies the position by asserting that "in letting things be encountered within the world, [society] gives them space…Dasein frees or clears a space for things to emerge, and frees the space or the place that is proper to such things"(p.68). Mairs (1996) claims her space within the world and clearly demonstrates the significance and capacity of 'shifting spatial perspectives' to re-define society by its ability to re-interpret viewpoints and re-characterize positions:

I am disabled then, only from 'your' point of view (and 'you' from 'mine'). Whoever gets to define ability puts everyone else in place, which (human nature tending to define one's own as the proper place) then becomes other, outside: a cheerless and chilly spot. No wonder I prefer the self-defined 'cripple.' When I have occasion to refer to a class with a broader spectrum of impairments, I use the more conventional 'people with disabilities,' or 'the disabled' for short; and people who lack them I call 'the nondisabled,' since in relation to me, they are the deficient ones. Already in this way, I begin to reconstruct the world (p.14).

The Space afforded Dasein with an Impairment

The lived body or situation… provides people with their perspective of the world… suggesting that although the body does not cease to be an object with physicality, it is a style of being, an intonation, a specific way of being present in the world (Moi, 2005, p.68).

To reiterate: Dasein is not a placeless entity but rather, situated in social space and conceptualized through its engagement in the world. The resultant 'making room' 26 or the giving of space is characteristic of the familiarity of Dasein and fundamentally different to the 'place' of equipment and positioning of objects or things in world-space. The general situation (Lage) signifies Dasein's existence in the social world and relation to 'others' (Baiasu, 2007). The everyday social world finds Dasein constantly with-others. Being-with is possible, for human 'being-ness' is essentially relational and therefore suggesting that one can walk alongside but also be 'outside' or disconnected to objects and individuals, "but [still] remain indicative of the other" (Heidegger, 1962, p.154). The social spatiality of Dasein is thus the spatiality of Being-with. Distinguished from the de-severance with relation to equipment, the making room for 'others,' has Dasein maintaining a 'distance' as Heidegger (1962) argues:

In one's concern with what one has taken hold of, whether with for, or against the others there is constant care as to the way one differs… whether… merely one to be evened out, whether one's own Dasein has lagged behind the others…or whether one's Dasein already has some priority… and sets out to keep them suppresses. The care about this distance… is disturbing to Being-with-one-another though this disturbance is… hidden from it. If we may express this existentially such Being-with-one-another has the character of distantiality (p.162, emphasis added).

This social character of distantiality 27 signifies distance as a feature of the general situation (Lage) of undifferentiated das Man in its objectification of Dasein with an Impairment for such 'things' or "entities were not the type of being[s] which would make it capable of de-servering… they merely have measurable distance [from das Man] which comes across" (Heidegger, 1962, p.139). Such 'distance,' remains clearly evident in the endemic discriminatory practices of ableist relations for 'ableism is the domination of space by an exclusionary ethos' 28 which allows Dasein with an Impairment to be little more than objects, present-at-hand.

Heidegger (1962) acknowledges that Dasein can be understood as present-at-hand (mere entities in worldspace) with "categorical characteristics of entities whose nature is not that of Dasein" (p.139). Such is the 'reality' of Dasein with an Impairment in contemporary society for as Malpas (2008) argues such a circumstance demonstrates a complete disregard for the existential state of Being-with. The nature and space afforded disability's regionality has been constituted and mediated with cultural processes (Michalko, 2009) to be "an alien terrain" (Mairs, 1996, p.72) and invalidated as a worthwhile existential status through historical social definition (Hughes, 2007). Studies in Ableism have shown that the process of social distancing has been accomplished through physical fear of frailty, bodily difference and social vulnerability that over time has provided the contemporary hierarchy of social legitimacy (Campbell, 2005; Hughes, 2007). Mairs (1996) experiences such abled-bodied distancing and reminds us of both the persistent categorizing and consequence of expectations through social authority, power and indeed fear:

To know that one arouses dismay and fear and pity simply sickens the spirit \of anyone whether sound of limb and mind or not. One is tempted to withdraw altogether, at least from the company of 'normals,' so as to avoid the indignity; but disappearance from the scene, however welcome to both parties, won't lead to change. It is not, after all, entirely the fault of people without disabilities that they don't know how to treat those of us with. Until rather recently, the lack of access and assistive technology, combined with social opprobrium, kept many of us out of public view. What intercourse occurred was marked by distance, restraint, even condescension, it was certainly not a communion of equals… in insisting that others view our lives as ample and precious, we are not demanding that they be made perfect. There are rewards for making the world physically and emotionally accessible to all people, including benefits that accrue to society as a whole. The more perspectives that can be brought to bear on human experience, even from the slant of a wheelchair… the richer the experience becomes. If it is both possible and pleasant for me and my kind to enter, the world will become a livelier place. You'll see (pp.103-106).

Hughes (2007) argues that ableism's normative fantasy of an invulnerable body has been widely used to create and sustain social distance between the abled-bodied and Dasein with an Impairment for disability represented all the difficulties of human existence. Moreover as "non-disabled people pity us, they presume that we must also pity ourselves" (Mairs, 1996, p.32). Yet the problem is actually a function of the privileged normative body of undifferentiated das Man in its rejection of its own vulnerability for Dasein with Impairment "exposes the illusion of autonomy, self-government and self-determination that underpins the fantasy of absolute abled-bodiness" (Thomson, 1997, p.45). Campbell (2005) asserts, almost without fail in modern discourse, disability "is assumed to be ontologically intolerable…inherently negative [and] always present in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization and humanness" (p.100) and truly ironic that das Man's ontological insecurity is the 'original sin' responsible for the marginalization of Dasein with an Impairment (Hughes, 2007). For disability is not the result of infractions against social norms but the delusion of the normative body to reject and dismiss its own vulnerability and date with death.

As Dasein exists in common with 'others,' Being-with presupposes the unsocial sociability 29 of humankind in which some individuals within society intentionally resist assimilation to the normative rule, rejecting the herd mentality (Malpas, 2008), providing for individuality, the inevitable conflict, mistrust and antagonism among members of the communal world. Heidegger (1962) 30 unveils this as the essential character of Being-with of Dasein for:

Everyday Being-with-one-another maintains itself between two forms of positive solicitude… that which jumps in and dominates and that which leaps forth and liberates…solicitude is guided by considerateness and forbearance…range[ing] through their respective deficient and indifferent modes up to the point of inconsiderateness or the perfunctoriness for which indifference leads the way (p.159, emphasis added).

Malpas (2008) argues that Being-with represents an understanding of 'residing' or 'dwelling,' involving familiarity and the sense of taking Care. Dwelling, being close, a 'nearing' is not objective difference but the bringing to attention, representations that would overcome the distance of inattention, 'invisibility' and negative attitudes which "hold the lives of some among us as cheap, even expendable" (Mairs, 1996, p.99). Solicitude then, becomes a state of Dasein's 'Being,' in "accordance with different possibilities [and] bound…towards a world of…concern and authenticity" (Heidegger, 1962, p.159). Being-with-one-another is "based proximally and often exclusively upon what is a matter of common concern in…Being…the result of uniformity (Entspringt) and commonality keeps das Man within limits though 'a mode of 'distance' (Abstend) and reserve" (Heidegger, 1962, p.159) which thrives on mistrust (Mißtrauen). Disability is the function of 'anxiety' within the social relationship between Dasein with an Impairment and social normativity. Mairs (1996) draws attention to such inauthentic, destructive tension or reserve, surrounding the desire for limiting the possibility of different possibilities of Being:

I do feel certain, in view of the human propensity for exploiting whatever techniques we can devise with virtually no regard for consequences, that more and more people will choose, either for their own reasons or in response to the social pressure not to produce 'unnecessary' burdens, to terminate pregnancies so as to avoid birth defects (and to select for sex as well). This development won't eradicate people with disabilities, of course: birth trauma, accidental injury, and disease will continue to create them from those who have started out as even the healthiest foetuses. What it will do is to make their social position even more marginal by emphasizing that no one with the power to choose would ever have permitted them to exist. Their own choice to survive will seem suspect. We're doing everything we can to exterminate your kind, the social message will read, and we'd get rid of you to if only we knew how. No one will ever say this. No one will have to (p.112)

Critical Disability Studies highlights the shared experience of Dasein with an Impairment in struggling for recognition and equal rights (Lee, 2006), as Linton (1998) maintains they were not just bound through biomedical lists of collective symptoms but through the social and political circumstances. Heidegger (1962) offers an explanation for this 'othering' through social attitude, barriers and the limitation of opportunities in suggesting the nature of Being-with-one-another forged through:

Those hired for the same affair often thrive only on mistrust however when devoted to the same affair, in common, their doing is determined by the manner in which Dasein, each in its own way has been taken hold of authentically… [making it] possible for the right kind of objectivity (die rechte Sachlichkeit) which frees the Other in his freedom for himself (p.159).

Humankind has produced the 'othering' of Dasein with an Impairment through the hiring of a welfare state devoted to profits rather than authentic interaction with others. In the general situation (Lage) or communal world, there is distance, for das Man is only concerned with the given, the present. Since this is an element of being-with, the undifferentiated state is not considerate, cohesive or united with Dasein with an Impairment but dispersed and aloof through distantiality constituting the definition of contemporary civil society (Gesellschaft) (Lewis, 2005; Fealy, 2008; Malpas, 2008; Michalko, 2009), which remains antagonistic through presupposition of 'distance' between individuals (Malpas, 2008). 31 Dasein, as a 'they-self,' gets lived by the commonsense ambiguity of that publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything but which has always made its decision for the "irresoluteness of 'The They' remains dominant" (Heidegger, 1962, p.345).

The Social Distancing (Distantiality) of Disability

Dasein's basic…Being is characterised by existence, by understanding what it means to be in a particular way…a self-interpreting 'Being' but there is no single way of taking hold of this existence that is mandatory or privileged (Salem-Wiseman, 2003, p.535, emphasis added).

Heidegger's (1962) spatiality as an existential, a condition of possibility, of basic disclosing of humankind's authenticity with relation to the Self, and the world (Baiasu, 2007) "holds none of the solipsistic 'traditions' or underpinning" of modern social relationships. For just as the individual does not first find itself apart from the world, the interaction of "self and the world, being given together, does not first find itself apart from the world but is instead always already there among others" (Malpas, 2008, p.89). However Dasein's 'thrownness' (circumstances basically beyond individual control) limits its particular path and possibility for in its everydayness, it has drifted along, choosing collectively, the least line of resistance in the stereotypical, ready-to-hand, socially approved alternatives (Baiasu, 2007; Salem-Wiseman, 2003). This universality or 'world conscience' is representative of the voice of das Man (removed from the Situation) and revealed only through the general situation (Lage) as justification and stipulation of possibilities through the domination of the undifferentiated civil society (Salem-Wiseman, 2003). Salem-Wiseman (2003) suggests Heidegger (1962) is not dismissive of the possibility of universal justice or rights per se, but underlined the issues with the particularization of moral and political principles. For as Mairs (1996) suggests, the nature of current ableist principles has affected her particular path, leaving her possibilities and existence restricted by the politics of marginalized interaction:

To insert my embodied self into a world with which over time, I have less and less in common. Part of my effort entails reshaping both that self and that world in order to reconcile the two. We bear certain responsibilities towards each other; the world and I and I must neither remove myself from it nor permit it to exclude me (p. 60).

While the constructed maintenance of perceived difference has provided historical forms of self-protection of the undifferentiated crowd (Kitchin, 2007), Critical Disability Studies calls for urgent political endeavour particularly as contemporary neo-liberal and globalization policies continue to increase marginalization of Dasein with an Impairment (Devlin and Pothier, 2006). Heidegger (1962) calls for cohesion; solidarity with 'others' through the authentic spatiality of Situation (Verbundenheit) which is not to be considered as static receptacle of entities ( present-at-hand) but a network of individual places (dwelling) bound with the historical past and future through resoluteness 32 (the authentic mode of disclosedness). In resoluteness, the issue for Dasein is its own most potentiality-for-Being through the discovery of factical possibilities (Ree, 1998; Tuttle, 2005). Unity of the social world will see das Man going beyond the spatiality of the undifferentiated general situation (Lage) to function authentically as Dasein, in the spatiality of Situation. Heidegger (1962) in dismissing the 'unconditioned' reality of human nature and offering Dasein as a socially embedded, "historically situated self-interpreter" (Salem-Wiseman, 2003, p.540) affords an explanation for eliminating the justification of 'norms,' as presented by the undifferentiated (general situation (Lage) as authoritative for all Dasein. Far from claiming social existence as the inherently inauthentic phenomena, Heidegger (1962) develops a positive interpretation of Dasein's relationships within a particular community 33 (Salem-Wiseman, 2003).

Yet the social construction of 'othering' has continued to be created and maintained through notions of moral superiority, the fear and suspicion of difference, and through specific policies as ingrained protection of the subjective undifferentiated. This learned response is the reaction and result of cultural fabrication and pressure rather than recognition of a primordial element (Shurmer-Smith and Hannam, 1994). Such implicit discrimination has kept Dasein with an Impairment 'in its place,' 'knowing its place,' belonging to a designated place (Kitchin, 2007) as merely present-at-hand and "ensuring [its] social position [as]… marginal" (Mairs, 1996, p.112) depending upon the degree and nature of 'othering' (Creswell, 1996). Heidegger (1962) suggests the "cultivation of such 'superior difference alienates Dasein from its ownmost potentiality-for-being" (p.298, original emphasis). Yet these cultural 'norms' have become legacies through perpetuity with das Man accepting the presumed 'normalcy' of accompanying exclusionary practices as the inevitable and 'commonsense' interaction.

Studies in Ableism is developing as a useful lens with which to unmask such an insidious, discriminatory ideology; the unconscious acceptance, the taken-for-granted practices and policies of social ordering legitimated through 'natural' classification in civil society (Creswell, 1996) and social determination of disability as an 'inferior' identity. For rather than "embracing disability at the level of 'being-ness (i.e. as an intrinsic part of the person's self), the processes of ableism…induce an internalization or self-loathing which devalues disablement" (Campbell, 2009, p.20).' This prejudiced 'creed' and common belief is further explained by Mairs (1996):

For illness and deformity, instead of being considered as human variants…have been portrayed as deviations from the human condition and brought on by personal failing or divine judgment (p.47).

Such sentiment, "of broken bodies as…spoiled and…the potential menace to the bodies around it" (Mairs, 1996, p.48) has deflected attention from the socio-economic political systems, which caused and constructed such oppressive reality. These negative ontologies of signification, of internal distancing and accompanying subjectification by the undifferentiated, have produced regulation and 'norms' (Campbell 2009). Heidegger (1962) suggests, the "dominance of the manner in which things have been publicly interpreted as 'The'They' has already decided what state-of-mind is to determine our attitudes" (p.298) for the normative construction, constitutive of the 'flawed other' provided safety from the fear of disability, delusion in thinking existence was secure, stable and autonomous (Hughes, 2007) and privileged in legal standing.

Campbell (2009) argues that law has been "traditionally ambivalent" (p.30) towards Dasein with an Impairment, restricting itself to arbitration of rules and policies of Care and protection. Yet while the rule of law would argue protection or a committed defence (Fürsorge) 34 of an individual against the arbitrary use of power by governments and institutions, interaction for Dasein with an Impairment has necessitated representation and action in accordance with the 'norms' of abled-ness (Campbell, 2009) and resultant levels of indifference (Besorge) 35 for any provision or 'security' for these people cost money…and why should society pay for someone's [individual] misfortune" (Mairs, 1996, p.122). Disability remains a 'thing' gone wrong, clearly evident and maintained through biomedicalization (Michalko, 2009). Indeed, Campbell (2009) stresses, the entry point of disability into law was through "doors of deficiency" (p.36) and in contesting the neutrality of legal space 36 pointed to the centrality of law in society's spatial hierarchy; for biomedical determination was policed and monitored (by law) as the authority to define identity and scrutinize disability prior to any process involving rights or protective remedies.

Massey (1997) proposes "spatiality is always and everywhere and expression and medium of power" (p.104) and nowhere is that power more obvious that in relation to economics where the productivity of Dasein with an Impairment is a function of its spatial relations. Civil society has remained committed to categorizing Dasein with an Impairment, and its position, or 'space' within the workforce has maintained and accommodated widespread distancing or discriminatory activity. 37 Critical Disability Studies however, offers an opportunity to explore the limits of contemporary economic tolerance or directionality to disability (Kymlicka, 1989). Kitchin (2007) in reference to workspace argues Dasein with an Impairment was excluded; deemed unproductive and hindered the process of capital accumulation. The spatialized political economy, as recognized in the centrality of power, was multifaceted in regionalities of exclusion and strategies of domination and resistance (Kymlicka, 1989). For while liberal ideology technically maintained accommodation policies (de-severance) in line with human rights legislation (Day and Brodsky, 1996) Thornton (2000) argues "neo-liberalism and its shift from equal opportunity to equal responsibility provides evidence that disabled people could only be assimilated (accommodated) if they replicate their benchmark confreres and do not make too many demands on the economic system" (p.19). "For 'The They' at the same time puts itself in the right and makes itself respectable by tactically regulating the way in which one has to comport oneself " (Heidegger, 1962, p.298).

Some disability studies scholars argue accommodation policy and neo-liberal conceptualization of a 'minority identity' is flawed by the implicit social 'norms' inherent in the determinations made by the powerful social groups responsible. As Campbell (2005) surmises it provides for governance and "politics of resentment" (p.116) by das Man for accommodation requires more than the grudging concession. Humankind, if it is to achieve authenticity needs to commit to and encourage the identity of the 'other' through the celebration of 'difference' as a community (Lee, 2006). The alternative is unacceptable. To disregard, to extinguish the reality and contribution of the other, is to project arrogance and superiority that is not authentic for to know the other is to know the self. The destructive nature of othering, the essence of individuality, the ranking and categorizing as present-at-hand has led humankind down a very dangerous path, historically and I suggest, affords it the space to repeat such atrocities for the undifferentiated remains easily distracted and willingly led towards its own oblivion.

The following quote from Mairs (1996) represents a powerful analogy highlighting the discriminatory strength of such oppressive limitation. I find the use of 'hygienic attitudes' particularly insightful in the correlation of disabled people and the German genocide of its Jewish citizenry. It affords a concise yet apt description of both the destructive force and reckless legitimization of righteous, intolerance and culturally defined hierarchies (The They) and thoughtless maintenance of social normative standards (das Man) based on habitual ableist dualities, as well as raising questions about the notion of personal authenticity:

I regularly encounter the sort of hygienic attitudes towards people with disabilities that might have permitted otherwise compassionate human beings to acquiesce in, or at least overlook [the Nazi] desecration of human life. These attitudes may be held, often unawares by people so well meaning and scrupulous that they would be aghast to have their opinion associated even tenuously with the atrocities of an indubitably mad dictator … because the political conditions are not equivalent, we can easily dismiss the underlying danger…[for] human personality tends to retain common elements across time, geography and political regime, being fond of familiar surroundings and routines…suspicious of outsiders, morally righteous, intolerant of ambiguity… unpleasantness…in whatever way its culturally defined …[in] existing social standards ( p. 98).

Hibbs and Pothier (2006) also found there was little recognition of the overall structural and systemic economic barriers for Dasein with an Impairment as the responsibility for the amelioration of 'difference' remained with it as a function of the contemporary governance and normalization processes, required through accommodation policies based on identity. Social power functioned through two dimensions; as a 'thing,' an inherent characteristic implying agency and negotiation and as Foucault (1977) discusses, a fluid network of relations that saw "individuals, self-perception and behaviour based in roles and identity within the system" (p.145). In this 'relationship' the identification of Dasein with an Impairment through standard social biomedical classification provided for a sense of legitimization, entitlement and overall perpetuation of their space. Dasein with an Impairment is a true representation of Foucault's 'docile bodies' (Foucault 1977) as such 'disciplinary power' presupposed agency of Dasein with an Impairment through the invisible, seemingly voluntary adoption of its 'assigned' role (Hibbs and Pothier, 2006) as a "vehicle of subordination" (Campbell, 2005, p.115). As Mairs (1996) elaborates:

People with disabilities…are scrutinized relentlessly…and are expected to fail… Are required in all sorts of subtle ways, even subconscious ways by themselves and others, to show [competence in work] to earn a place among 'normals…only when a new model which defines people with disabilities very precisely in terms not of what they cannot…do but what they can, will the world stop imposing this unwholesome sort of dependency (pp.92-.93).

The biomedicalization of disability has Dasein with an Impairment responsible for instituting their own equity and is also illustrative of disciplinary nature of power (Hibbs and Pothier, 2006). Foucault (1977) suggests that the "establishment of the 'normal' was a principle of coercion…[an] instrument of power, not only indicat[ing] one's membership in a homogenous group [but] play[ing] a part in the classification, hierarchization and distribution of rank"(p.184). There would be little discussion among the ranks of the undifferentiated as to the present nature of space afforded Dasein with an Impairment in contemporary society. Indeed the simplicity of Mairs (1996) plea is a stark reminder of the present-at-hand, callous reality, or relegated positioning 'afforded' disabled individuals by 'The They' in contemporary society:

I imagine a world where people, allowed the space to accept-admit, endure, embrace-their diverse and often difficult realities, will be able to take reasonable measures to ensure basic health without getting burned by a doctor eager to inject them with cobra venom; a dentist willing to tear out all their dental work or a butcher-turned biochemist who wants to drip fluids from unlabeled bottles into veins (p.169).

The Zones of Dis-suitability

Heidegger's (1962) notion of Being-in then, distinguishes the spatiality of Dasein's social existence as 'involvement' (through dwelling and active involvement in the world) from that of 'containment' (the extendable, measurable, objectivity of space) (Malpas, 2008). Malpas (2008) further maintains that this analytical distinction within Heidegger's (1962) discussion of spatiality (through involvement) underlines the notion of dwelling within the world and provides an analysis of dependence or dependent relations within the orientation of Dasein. Therefore this final discussion will adopt Malpas' (2008) interpretation to extrapolate and explore 'dependant relations' with respect to the orientation of Dasein with an Impairment to das Man through the dependence of a) existential spatiality on the functions of the self (Care) b) equipment spatiality on existential spatiality and c) objective spatiality on spatiality of the world. While acknowledging the centrality of temporality in Heidegger's (1962) discussion on these dependencies, I concur with Malpas (2008) in asserting the co-existential relationship of spatiality and its determining influence on such orientation.

The question of orientation through this interpretation has given prominence to the issue of embodiment and the matter of bodily orientation. However, as also previously established in this paper, Heidegger (1962) recognizes the importance of the body 38 and views its bodily nature as essential to its thrownness for he later writes, "Dasein is thrown, factical, thoroughly amidst nature through its bodiliness" (Heidegger,1984, p 166). The 'problem' of Dasein's body is directly related to its spatiality for as Heidegger (1962) explains:

Dasein does not fill up a bit of space as Real Thing or item of equipment… so the boundaries dividing it from the surrounding space would themselves just define that space spatially. Dasein takes space in… It is by no means just present-at-hand at a position in space which its body fills up… Neither may Dasein's spatiality be interpreted as an imperfection which adheres to existence by reason of the fatal linkage of the spirit to the body… On the contrary, because Dasein is 'spiritual' [Geistig] and only because of this, it can be spatial in a way that remains essentially impossible for any extended corporeal thing (p.419).

Although Heidegger (1962) continues with the foundational nature of temporality over spatiality, Dasein's body is essentially produced by its Being-in-the-world, through Care and temporality. The Being of Dasein, as embodied and spatial, is determined through its spirituality (Geistig) for its orientation in space, to "things and places in its environment or region, depend on the articulation of spatiality in and through its own body" (Malpas, 2008, p.130). To summarize once again, Heidegger (1962) maintains that Dasein's spatiality is not a matter of the body, but of existence. Directionality of distance is founded on Being-in-the-world. "Left' and 'right' are not subjective for which the subject has a 'feeling;' they are directions of one's directedness into the world that is 'ready-to-hand' already" (Heidegger, 1962, p.144). Orientation is dependent on an understanding of simultaneously presented regions of space and of the 'ordering' of these regions (Malpas, 2008) and varies depending on the located individual and more particularly from the way the individual body is positioned in space and with respect to its surroundings. The ordering of "space the body was 'in' was also an ordering of the space of the body" (Malpas, 2008, p.128, emphasis added). At issue then is space in relation to the body; for insomuch as it is a prerequisite of orientation, embodiment becomes a pre-requisite (Arisaka, 1995; Baiasu, 2007; Malpas, 2008) for Being- in- the-world.